Re: NFS4 authentification / fsuid

[Satyam Sharma <satyam@infradead.org>]

On Wed, 19 Sep 2007, Kyle Moffett wrote:
> 
> > [all sorts of crap about spies in washington needing stronger protection
> > than your average consumer]
> 
> [snip]
> 
> [...] all the bullcrap about foreign intelligence

Hehe, again, *you* started all the "bullcrap" about foreign "governments"
in the first place :-)


> is just drawing
> focus off of how easy it is to achieve *adequate* physical protection where it
                                          ^^^^^^^^
> matters.

Ah, so you're qualifying the discussion with the nice and subjective
"adequate" ... (you're still wrong, of course)


> Of course, this also relies on being able to teach the stupid lusers with the
> laptops not to give their boot password to the "service tech on the phone"

Let's stick on-topic here ... remember "securing a system against attacker
with physical access is fairly simple" ?

[ Took the liberty of removing some irrelevant digressions -- didn't see
  any solid security scheme that fulfils/justifies your earlier claim over
  there. ]


> > > If your system equates end-user with attacker
> > 
> > "If"? Was there ever any doubt?
> > 
> > Heh, did you even read the thread you just replied to?
> 
> Yes I did [...]

No, you didn't -- it was obvious from your reply :-)

> and I wanted to make it *really* clear that with average hardware
> you can properly protect against virtually all of the *common* attack vectors.
                                                         ^^^^^^

But what gave you the impression we're interested in discussing "common"
or "adequate enough" attack vectors here?

See, if you have something useful/new to contribute to the discussion,
that we don't already know, then please don't hold back and feel free to
do so ...


Satyam
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