On Sep 06, 2007, at 11:06:16, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
On Thu, Sep 06, 2007 at 01:44:05PM +0530, Satyam Sharma wrote:
Like Trond said, there are very high number of ways in which
privileged userspace can compromise a running kernel if it really
wants to do that, root-is-God has always been *the* major problem
with Unix :-)
The only _real_ way a kernel can lock itself completely against
malicious userspace involves trusted tamperproof hardware,
The question of how to protect against someone with *physical*
access certainly is more difficult, but surely that's a separate
problem.
Actually, that's a fairly simple problem (barring disassembling the
system and attaching a hardware debugger). You encrypt the root
filesystem and require a password to boot (See: LUKS). Debian has
built-in support for installing onto fs-on-LVM-on-crypt-on-RAID, and
it works quite well on all the laptops I use regularly. It's not
even much of a speed penalty; once you take the overhead of hitting a
5400RPM laptop drive you can chew thousands of cycles of CPU without
anybody noticing (much). Then all you have to do is burn a copy of
your /boot with bootloader onto some read-only media (like a
finalized CDROM/DVDROM) and you're set to go.
Cheers,
Kyle Moffett
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