Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

[Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>]

On Fri, 2007-06-22 at 14:42 +0200, Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote:
> On 2007-06-22T07:53:47, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> 
> > > No the "incomplete" mediation does not flow from the design.  We have
> > > deliberately focused on doing the necessary modifications for pathname
> > > based mediation.  The IPC and network mediation are a wip.
> > The fact that you have to go back to the drawing board for them is that
> > you didn't get the abstraction right in the first place.
> 
> That's an interesting claim, however I don't think it holds. AA was
> designed to mediate file access in a form which is intuitive to admins.
> 
> It's to be expected that it doesn't directly apply to mediating other
> forms of access.
> 
> > I think we must have different understandings of the words "generalize"
> > and "analyzable".  Look, if I want to be able to state properties about
> > data flow in the system for confidentiality or integrity goals (my
> > secret data can never leak to unauthorized entities, my critical data
> > can never be corrupted/tainted by unauthorized entities - directly or
> > indirectly),
> 
> I seem to think that this is not what AA is trying to do, so evaluating
> it in that context doesn't seem useful. It's like saying a screw driver
> isn't a hammer, so it is useless because you have a nail.

Again, in that case, please remove all uses of the terms "mandatory
access control", "confinement" and "integrity protection" from AA
documentation and code.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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