Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

[Lars Marowsky-Bree <lmb@suse.de>]

On 2007-06-22T07:53:47, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:

> > No the "incomplete" mediation does not flow from the design.  We have
> > deliberately focused on doing the necessary modifications for pathname
> > based mediation.  The IPC and network mediation are a wip.
> The fact that you have to go back to the drawing board for them is that
> you didn't get the abstraction right in the first place.

That's an interesting claim, however I don't think it holds. AA was
designed to mediate file access in a form which is intuitive to admins.

It's to be expected that it doesn't directly apply to mediating other
forms of access.

> I think we must have different understandings of the words "generalize"
> and "analyzable".  Look, if I want to be able to state properties about
> data flow in the system for confidentiality or integrity goals (my
> secret data can never leak to unauthorized entities, my critical data
> can never be corrupted/tainted by unauthorized entities - directly or
> indirectly),

I seem to think that this is not what AA is trying to do, so evaluating
it in that context doesn't seem useful. It's like saying a screw driver
isn't a hammer, so it is useless because you have a nail.


Regards,
    Lars

-- 
Teamlead Kernel, SuSE Labs, Research and Development
SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nürnberg)
"Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." -- Oscar Wilde

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