Re: [patch 0/6] lightweight robust futexes: -V3

[Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>]

* Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> wrote:

> That malicious code would have no need to have the kernel futext 
> handling code do its dirty work indirectly via manipulations of this 
> list.  It can just do the dirty work directly.
> 
> All Ingo needs to insure is that the kernel will assume no more 
> priviledge when reading/writing this list than the current task had, 
> from user space, reading/writing this list.

Correct, this is precisely what happens.

Furthermore, the new exit-time futex code within the kernel will do only 
one, very limited thing with userspace memory: it will atomically set 
bit 30 of a word at a userspace address (if the word is accessible to 
and writable by userspace), if and only if that word is equal to 
current->pid. This is really not the sort of memory writing capability 
attackers are looking for :-)

Btw., we already have a similar mechanism in the kernel (and had for 
years): the current->clear_child_tid pointer will be overwritten with 0 
by the kernel at do_exit() time, and causes a futex wakeup. See 
kernel/fork.c:mm_release():

        if (tsk->clear_child_tid && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
                u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
                tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;

                /*
                 * We don't check the error code - if userspace has
                 * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
                 */
                put_user(0, tidptr);
                sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);

So the concept is not unprecedented at all, nor did it ever cause any 
security problems [and i think i'd know - i wrote the above code too].  
And 'write 0' is slightly more interesting to attackers than 'set bit 30 
if word equals to TID'.

	Ingo
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