Re: Hyper-Threading Vulnerability

[Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>]

On Fri, May 13, 2005 at 12:02:44PM -0700, Andy Isaacson wrote:
> On Fri, May 13, 2005 at 11:30:27AM -0700, Vadim Lobanov wrote:
> > On Fri, 13 May 2005, Andy Isaacson wrote:
> > > It's a side channel timing attack on data-dependent computation through
> > > the L1 and L2 caches.  Nice work.  In-the-wild exploitation is
> > > difficult, though; your timing gets screwed up if you get scheduled away
> > > from your victim, and you don't even know, because you can't tell where
> > > you were scheduled, so on any reasonably busy multiuser system it's not
> > > clear that the attack is practical.
> > 
> > Wouldn't scheduling appear as a rather big time delta (in measuring the
> > cache access times), so you would know to disregard that data point?
> > 
> > (Just wondering... :-) )
> 
> Good question.  Yes, you can probably filter the data.  The question is,
> how hard is it to set up the conditions to acquire the data?  You have
> to be scheduled on the same core as the target process (sibling
> threads).  And you don't know when the target is going to be scheduled,
> and on a real-world system, there are other threads competing for
> scheduling; if it's SMP (2 core, 4 thread) with perfect 100% utilization
> then you've only got a 33% chance of being scheduled on the right
> thread, and it gets worse if the machine is idle since the kernel should
> schedule you and the OpenSSL process on different cores...
>...

But if you start 3 processes in the idle case you might get a 100% 
chance?

> -andy

cu
Adrian

-- 

       "Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out
        of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days.
       "Only a promise," Lao Er said.
                                       Pearl S. Buck - Dragon Seed

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