On 06/22/2010 02:01 PM, Wolfgang S. Rupprecht was caught red-handed while writing:: > Bruno Wolff III<bruno@xxxxxxxx> writes: > >> That depends on your threat model. If you don't trust the wireless operator >> the wireless encryption isn't that big of a deal since you need to use an >> encrypted tunnel in any case. >> > No kidding. You should use some form of end-to-end encryption any time > you are on the net and don't want your packets looked over. SSH, HTTPS, > SMTP w. TLS have their uses. > > BTW. Even WPA2-PSK seems to have some weaknesses with respect to > inter-customer eavesdropping. There is some claim that the per-host > keys aren't as securely chosen as they should be. > > -wolfgang > WPA2-PSK + AES : I thought it is not possible for inter-customer traffic to figure out the keys because once the connection is established, keys change dynamically per the protocol. Perhaps a an expert on the WPA2-PSK protocl can shed some light on this. -- users mailing list users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe or change subscription options: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/users Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
