On Wed, 2009-01-21 at 13:42 -0800, Kam Leo wrote: > On Wed, Jan 21, 2009 at 12:47 PM, Patrick O'Callaghan > <pocallaghan@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 2:12 PM, Kevin Kofler <kevin.kofler@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> Richard Hughes wrote: > >>> Sure, but my point if that GTK code is untrusted, and just not designed > >>> to be run with elevated privileges. A buffer-overflow is an easy exploit > >>> if the code is running as uid 0, whether running as setuid or as root. > >> > >> Why would you overflow a buffer on your own machine where you're already > >> root? It makes sense to attack a setuid binary on a machine you're not root > >> on, but it doesn't make sense to attack your own machine. > > > > Really? In that case I invite you to visit my website evil.com and > > click on a few links. Better still, log into my friendly server and > > run a few of my apps. They're running on my machine, not yours. Of > > course the GUI runs on your machine via X11 ... > > > > poc > > A GUI is not required to compromise a machine. No need to go after the > root user either. Take a gander here: > http://www.linuxsecurity.com/content/blogcategory/89/102/7/0/ ---- well now...there's a cogent argument. Suggesting that even though few of the applications that run on X are audited for security when run as superuser, that it becomes acceptable to do so because other exploits exist that don't require X to propagate. Interesting logical expansion Craig -- fedora-list mailing list fedora-list@xxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe: https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-list Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Communicate/MailingListGuidelines
