On Mon, 2006-03-06 at 17:59, Michael H. Warfield wrote: > In the security business, we have and expression for people like you. > Those people who use the "install everything" button just because they > "might" want something in the future (and then forget they installed it, > if they even realize they installed it to begin with). > > We dub thee "owned". As I said back a few messages, this is not what you want on a production server. However, if you don't try the new stuff somewhere, how are you ever going to know if it will improve your production or not? > The funny thing is that (and I've seen this in this thread) most of the > time people will use the argument that the newbie user is the one who > needs the "install everything" option, because they don't know what they > want, so they'll be sure to get it. They are EXACTLY the LAST people > who need or should use that damn thing. They are the MOST likely to get > burned by it (and I've spent too much time helping newbies fix broken > systems what would not have been broken into if they had only installed > what they needed). The people who need it are the ones deciding what needs to run in production next month. A lot of people are doing a lot of work writing this stuff. Do you want only your competitors to be using it? > Fine, now we are much more careful that > "installed" services are not "enabled" services until you take some > action. And the firewall defaults definitely help. But what about > Apache add ons (like PHP et al). What about them? Name *one* service that hasn't had security issues. They get found and fixed only after people start using them. Speeding up that process helps us all. > I've preached for years that one of the worst security vulnerability in > many Linux distributions was the "install everything" button. That > remains true to this day. Ignorance WILL bite you. If a distribution contains security flaws they need to be fixed, not ignored. -- Les Mikesell lesmikesell@xxxxxxxxx