-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Wednesday 07 January 2004 12:40, Warren Togami wrote: > For this reason everyone should sign absolutely everything. While > signatures alone don't protect you from malicious code or binaries, they > help to create a paper trail. Couldn't agree more... but the original point is that railing against doing a make as root is not going to solve anything when we are daily installing RPMs as root, signed or unsigned. And as you point out, the signature is only an assurance that at some point the package was processed by somebody who had that private key.... it doesn't have anything to say about the untaintedness of the sources -- or the security of the signer's machines and key. Unless you undertake to scour sources personally and install by compile only - -- something most people would reasonably consider an impossible burden -- you take on a risk by using binary packages, and its hard to see what can be done to mitigate that, especially when attacks inside RPM scripts could be very subtle and indirect. - -Andy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQE//AJsjKeDCxMJCTIRAkBUAJ0Yd/2VscGWGO4YoagNN9Bz2/pTUwCcD3g5 oNmNGl4yZgMs9N/gAzvc76Y= =sBfk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
