On Sat, Nov 10, 2007 at 05:27:51PM -0800, [email protected] wrote: > On Sat, 10 Nov 2007, Alan Cox wrote: > >>> but how can the system know if the directory the user wants to add is >>> reasonable or not? what if the user says they want to store their >>> documents in /etc? >> >> A more clear example is wanting to wrap a specific tool with temporary >> rules. Those rules would depend on the exact file being edited at this >> moment - something root cannot know in advance >> (although with apparmor I guess mv $my_file apparmour_magic.name ; foo; >> mv it back might work 8)) > > the mechanism being desired was that the system administrator would setup a > restrictive policy and a user who wanted a more permissive policy would > have the ability to make it more permissive. > > this sort of thing is a disaster waiting to happen. > yep > however, if App Armor sets things up so that there can be a system policy > that users cannot touch, but users can have a secondary policy that layers > over the system one to restrict things further it could be safe. > > if a sysadmin wants to have 'soft' and 'hard' limits of what a user can do, > they could put the 'hard' limits in the system policy (and the users > _cannot_ violate these limits), and then set the 'soft' limits in the users > default setup (similar to how .profile is set by default). if a user wants > to make things less restrictive they could edit or remove the per-user > policy, but would still not be able to violate the system policy. > > however, while this seems attractive, I'm not sure that madness isn't down > the road a little bit. since the users policy would only apply to > themselves, you have the situation that (DAC permissions permitting) the > files are available to other confined processes becouse they are running as > other users. this sort of thing will surprise people if the explinations > aren't done very carefully. > yes, the devil is in the details.
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