Re: [RFC]selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance

[Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>]

On Thu, 13 Sep 2007 08:58:32 -0400
Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, 2007-09-12 at 17:51 +0900, Yuichi Nakamura wrote:
<snip>
> Thanks, a few comments below.
Thanks for comments!

> > 
> > * Description of patch
> > This patch improves performance of read/write in SELinux.
> > It improves performance by skipping permission check in 
> > selinux_file_permission. Permission is only checked when 
> > sid change or policy load is detected after file open.
> > To detect sid change, new LSM hook securiy_dentry_open is added.
> 
> I think I'd reword this a little, e.g.
> 
> It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
> permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
> changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check.  A new LSM
> hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at
> open time to allow this optimization.
I see, I will use that.

> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
> > ---
> >  fs/open.c                         |    5 ++++
> >  include/linux/security.h          |   16 ++++++++++++++
> >  security/dummy.c                  |    6 +++++
> >  security/selinux/avc.c            |    5 ++++
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c          |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  security/selinux/include/avc.h    |    2 +
> >  security/selinux/include/objsec.h |    2 +
> >  7 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> <snip>
> > diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > --- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c	2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
> > +++ linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/hooks.c	2007-09-12 08:42:49.000000000 +0900
> > @@ -80,6 +82,7 @@
> >  
> >  #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
> >  #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
> > +#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
> 
> Leftover from prior version of the patch, no longer needed.
Fixed.

> 
> <snip>
> > @@ -2715,6 +2737,23 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct f
> >  	return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
> >  }
> >  
> > +static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
> > +{
> > +	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
> > +	struct inode *inode;
> > +	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> > +	inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
> > +	fsec = file->f_security;
> > +	isec = inode->i_security;
> 
> I'd add a comment here, e.g.
> 	  /* 
> 	   * Save inode label and policy sequence number
> 	   * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
> 	   * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
> 	   * Task label is already saved in the file security
>            * struct as its SID.
> 	   */
Fixed.

> 
> > +	fsec->isid = isec->sid;
> > +	fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
> > +
> > +	/*Permission has to be rechecked here.
> > +	  Policy load of inode sid can happen between
> > +	  may_open and selinux_dentry_open.*/
> 
> Typo in the comment (s/of/or/), coding style isn't right for a
> multi-line comment, and likely needs clarification, e.g.
> 	/*
> 	 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
> 	 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
> 	 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
> 	 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
> 	 * new inode label or new policy.
> 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove. 
> 	 */
Fixed.


> 
> > +	return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
> > +}
> > +
> >  /* task security operations */
> >  
> >  static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
> 
> > diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/fs/open.c linux-2.6.22/fs/open.c
> > --- linux-2.6.22.orig/fs/open.c	2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
> > +++ linux-2.6.22/fs/open.c	2007-09-12 08:31:24.000000000 +0900
> > @@ -696,8 +696,13 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct
> >  	f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
> >  	file_move(f, &inode->i_sb->s_files);
> >  
> > +	error = security_dentry_open(f);
> > +	if (error)
> > +		goto cleanup_all;
> > +
> >  	if (!open && f->f_op)
> >  		open = f->f_op->open;
> > +
> 
> Extraneous whitespace leftover from prior version of the patch.
Fixed.

> 
> >  	if (open) {
> >  		error = open(inode, f);
> >  		if (error)
> > diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22.orig/include/linux/security.h linux-2.6.22/include/linux/security.h
> > --- linux-2.6.22.orig/include/linux/security.h	2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
> > +++ linux-2.6.22/include/linux/security.h	2007-09-12 08:30:16.000000000 +0900
> > @@ -503,6 +503,11 @@ struct request_sock;
> >   *	@file contains the file structure being received.
> >   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> >   *
> > + * Security hook for dentry
> > + *
> > + * @dentry_open
> > + *   Check permission or get additional information before opening dentry.
> > + *
> 
> More precisely, "Save open-time permission checking state for later use
> upon file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed since
> inode_permission."
Fixed.

> -- 
> Stephen Smalley
> National Security Agency

I would like to send patch in next e-mail in new thread.

Regards,
-- 
Yuichi Nakamura
Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
Japan SELinux Users Group(JSELUG): http://www.selinux.gr.jp/
SELinux Policy Editor: http://seedit.sourceforge.net/

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