Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

[Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>]

david@lang.hm wrote:
> On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>
> > Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote:
> > >  On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> > >  <snip>
> > >
> > >
> > > >  Um, no.  It might not be able to directly open files via that 
> > > path, but
> > > >  showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather 
> > > different
> > > >  matter.
> > > >
> > >  Yes. Your use case is different than mine.
> >
> > So.. your use case is what? If an AA user asked you to protect his 
> > mail from his browser I'm sure you'd truthfully answer "no, we can't 
> > do that but we can protect the path to your mail from your browser".. 
> > I think not. One need only look at the wonderful marketing literature 
> > for AA to see what you are telling people it can do, and your above 
> > statement isn't consistent with that, sorry.
>
> remember, the policies define a white-list

Except for unconfined processes.

> so if a hacker wants to have mozilla access the mail files he needs to 
> get some other process on the sysstem to create a link or move a file 
> to a path that mozilla does have access to. until that is done there 
> is no way for mozilla to access the mail through the filesystem.
>
> other programs could be run that would give mozilla access to the mail 
> contents, but it would be through some other path that the policy 
> permitted mozilla accessing in the first place.
Or through IPC or the network, that is the point, filesystem only 
coverage doesn't cut it; there is no way to say the browser can't access 
the users mail in AA, and there never will be.

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