Re: Require mmap handler for a.out executables

[Bodo Eggert <7eggert@gmx.de>]

On Thu, 27 Jul 2006, Alan Cox wrote:
> Ar Iau, 2006-07-27 am 19:49 +0200, ysgrifennodd Bodo Eggert:

> > Can shell scripts or binfmt_misc be exploited, too? Even if not, I'd
> > additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.
> 
> Why force them, this is just papering over imagined cracks and running
> from shadows. If users want to be paranoid about these file systems or
> their distro vendor is smart then the ability to set noexec/nosuid is
> already supported and even more can be done with selinux. In fact as its
> usually mounted in one place even AppArmor might be able to get it right
> 8)

s/force/default to/, since it's not OK to let the admin shoot his feet 
unless he _explicitely_ demands to. What if the next crack allows evading 
nosuid by using proc?

Being paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you ...
-- 
bus error. passengers dumped.
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