Re: [PATCH -mm 5/7] add user namespace

[ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)]

Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> writes:

> On Fri, 2006-07-14 at 12:08 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> yes, of course, vfsmount, which I assume is what Eric meant?
>> 
>> Which means we'd have to do this at permission() using the nameidata, or
>> pass nd to generic_permission. 
>
> Yeah, I think so.  But, this is well into Al territory, and there might
> be a better way.

Well until we get that sorted out I will keep picking on i_sb.

The one thing that just occurred to me is that the generic permission
should end up structured as below.  I don't know if it is cheaper
but it is certainly more obvious.

Eric


  int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
  		int (*check_acl)(struct inode *inode, int mask))
  {
  	umode_t			mode = inode->i_mode;
  
+       if (unlikely(current->nsproxy->user_ns != inode->i_sb->user_ns))
+          	goto unknown_user;

  	if (current->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
  		mode >>= 6;
  	else {
  		if (IS_POSIXACL(inode) && (mode & S_IRWXG) && check_acl) {
  			int error = check_acl(inode, mask);
  			if (error == -EACCES)
  				goto check_capabilities;
  			else if (error != -EAGAIN)
  				return error;
  		}
  
  		if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid))
  			mode >>= 3;
  	}
+ unknown_user:
  
  	/*
  	 * If the DACs are ok we don't need any capability check.
  	 */
  	if (((mode & mask & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC)) == mask))
  		return 0;
  
   check_capabilities:
  	/*
  	 * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
  	 * Executable DACs are overridable if at least one exec bit is set.
  	 */
  	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) ||
  	    (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
  		if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
  			return 0;
  
  	/*
  	 * Searching includes executable on directories, else just read.
  	 */
  	if (mask == MAY_READ || (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !(mask & MAY_WRITE)))
  		if (capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
  			return 0;
  
  	return -EACCES;
  }

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