On Tue, Jun 27, 2006 at 10:07:29PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Herbert Poetzl <[email protected]> writes:
>
> > On Tue, Jun 27, 2006 at 10:29:39AM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> Herbert Poetzl <[email protected]> writes:
> >
> >> I watched the linux-vserver irc channel for a while and almost
> >> every network problem was caused by the change in semantics
> >> vserver provides.
> >
> > the problem here is not the change in semantics compared
> > to a real linux system (as there basically is none) but
> > compared to _other_ technologies like UML or QEMU, which
> > add the need for bridging and additional interfaces, while
> > Linux-VServer only focuses on the IP layer ...
>
> Not being able to bind to INADDR_ANY is a huge semantic change.
> Unless things have changed recently you get that change when
> you have two IP addresses in Linux-Vserver.
not at all, you probably looked at a different
code, binding to INADDR_ANY actually _is_ the
default inside a guest, the only difference here
is that INADDR_ANY maps to a subset of _all_
available IPs ...
> Talking to the outsider world through the loop back interface
> is a noticeable semantics change.
this does not happen either, as I said several
times, networking happens as on a _normal_
linux system, local traffic uses loop back, while
outbound traffic uses the appropriate network
interfaces
> Having to be careful of who uses INADDR_ANY on the host
> when you have guests is essentially a semantics change.
this 'semantic' change is intentional, and it
would be quite easy to change that (by putting
the host in a network context too) but as the
mechanism is isolation the host, similar to the
chroot() semantic for filesystems, sees _all_
the interfaces and IPs and therefore can also
bind to all of them ...
> Being able to talk to the outside world with a server
> bound only to the loopback IP is a weird semantic
> change.
that does not happen either ...
IMHO you should have a closer look (or ask more
questions) before making false assumptions
> And I suspect I missed something, it is weird peculiar and
> I don't care to remember all of the exceptions.
there are no real exceptions, we have a legacy
mapping which basically 'remaps' localhost to
the first assigned IP (to make guest local traffic
secure without messing with the network stack)
but this can be avoided completely
> Have a few more network interfaces for a layer 2 solution
> is fundamental. Believing without proof and after arguments
> to the contrary that you have not contradicted that a layer 2
> solution is inherently slower is non-productive.
assuming that it will not be slower, although it
will now pass two network stacks and the bridging
code is non-productive too, let's see how it goes
but do not ignore the overhead just because it
might simplify the implementation ...
> Arguing that a layer 2 only solution most prove itself on
> guest to guest communication is also non-productive.
>
> So just to sink one additional nail in the coffin of the silly
> guest to guest communication issue. For any two guests where
> fast communication between them is really important I can run
> an additional interface pair that requires no routing or bridging.
> Given that the implementation of the tunnel device is essentially
> the same as the loopback interface and that I make only one
> trip through the network stack there will be no performance overhead.
that is a good argument and I think I'm perfectly
fine with this, given that the implementation
allows that (i.e. the network stack can handle
two interfaces with the same IP assigned and will
choose the local interface over the remote one
when the traffic will be between guests)
> Similarly for any critical guest communication to the outside world
> I can give the guest a real network adapter.
with a single MAC assigned, that is, I presume?
> That said I don't think those things will be necessary and that if
> they are it is an optimization opportunity to make various bits
> of the network stack faster.
>
> Bridging or routing between guests is an exercise in simplicity
> and control not a requirement.
>
> >> In this case when you allow a guest more than one IP your hack
> >> while easy to maintain becomes much more complex.
> >
> > why? a set of IPs is quite similar to a single IP (which
> > is actually a subset), so no real change there, only
> > IP_ANY means something different for a guest ...
>
> Which simply filtering at bind time makes impossible.
>
> With a guest with 4 IPs
> 10.0.0.1 192.168.0.1 172.16.0.1 127.0.0.1
> How do you make INADDR_ANY work with just filtering at bind time?
>
> The host has at least the additional IPs.
> 10.0.0.2 192.168.0.2 172.16.0.2 127.0.0.1
>
> Herbert I suspect we are talking about completely different
> implementations otherwise I can't possibly see how we have
> such different perceptions of their capabilities.
guess that's what this discussion is about,
finding out the various aspects how isolation
and/or vitrtualization can be accomplished and
what features we consider common/useful enough
for mainline ... for me that is still in the
brainstorming phase, although several 'working
prototypes' already exist. IMHO the next step
is to collect a set of representative use cases
and test them with each implementation, regarding
performance, usability and practicability
> I am talking precisely about filter IP addresses at connect
> or bind time that a guest can use. Which as I recall is
> what vserver implements. If you are thinking of your ngnet
> implementation that would explain things.
I'm thinking of all the various implementations
and 'prototypes' we did and tested, I agree
this might be confusing ...
> >> Especially as you address each case people care about one at a time.
> >
> > hmm?
>
> Multiple IPs, IPv6, additional protocols, firewalls. etc.
>
> >> In one shot this goes the entire way. Given how many people miss that
> >> you do the work at layer 2 than at layer 3 I would not call this the
> >> straight forward approach. The straight forward implementation yes,
> >> but not the straight forward approach.
> >
> > seems I lost you here ...
>
>
> >> > for example, you won't have multiple routing tables
> >> > in a kernel where this feature is disabled, no?
> >> > so why should it affect a guest, or require modified
> >> > apps inside a guest when we would decide to provide
> >> > only a single routing table?
> >> >
> >> >> From my POV, fully virtualized namespaces are the future.
> >> >
> >> > the future is already there, it's called Xen or UML, or QEMU :)
> >>
> >> Yep. And now we need it to run fast.
> >
> > hmm, maybe you should try to optimize linux for Xen then,
> > as I'm sure it will provide the optimal virtualization
> > and has all the features folks are looking for (regarding
> > virtualization)
> >
> > I thought we are trying to figure a light-weight subset
> > of isolation and virtualization technologies and methods
> > which make sense to have in mainline ...
>
> And you presume doing things at layer 2 is more expensive than
> layer 3.
not necessarily, but I _know_ that the overhead
added at layer 3 is unmeasureable, and it still
needs to be proven that this is true for a layer
2 solution (which I'd actually prefer, because
it solves the protocol _and_ setup issues)
> >From what I have seen of layer 3 solutions it is a
> bloody maintenance nightmare, and an inflexible mess.
that is your opinion, I really doubt that you
will have less maintenance when you apply policy
to the guests ...
example here (just to clarify):
- let's assume we have eth0 on the host and in
guest A and B, with the following setup:
eth0(H) 192.168.0.1/24
eth0(A) 10.0.1.1/16 10.0.1.2/16
eth0(B) 10.0.2.1/16
- now what keeps guest B from jsut assigning
10.0.2.2/16 to eth0? you need some kind of
mechanism to prevent that, and/or to block
the packets using inappropriate IPs
* in the first case, i.e. you prevent assigning
certain IPs inside a guest, you get a semantic
change in the behaviour compared to a normal
system, but there is no additional overhead
on the communication
* in the second case, you have to maintain the
policy mechanism and keep it in sync with the
guest configuration (somehow), and of course
you have to verify every communication
- OTOH, if you do not care about collisions
basically assuming the point "that's like
a hub on a network, if there are two guests
with the same ip, it will be trouble, but
that's okay" then this becomes a real issue
for providers with potentially 'evil' customers
best,
Herbert
> >> >> It is what makes virtualization solution usable (w/o apps
> >> >> modifications), provides all the features and doesn't require much
> >> >> efforts from people to be used.
> >> >
> >> > and what if they want to use virtualization inside
> >> > their guests? where do you draw the line?
> >>
> >> The implementation doesn't have any problems with guests inside
> >> of guests.
> >>
> >> The only reason to restrict guests inside of guests is because
> >> the we aren't certain which permissions make sense.
> >
> > well, we have not even touched the permission issues yet
>
> Agreed, permissions have not discussed but the point is that is the only
> reason to keep from nesting the networking stack the way I have described
> it.
>
> Eric
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