On Thu, 2006-04-27 at 16:44 -0700, Chris Wright wrote:
> * Karl MacMillan ([email protected]) wrote:
> > While this is example of labeling issues with SELinux is correct for a
> > standard targeted policy, it does not represent an intrinsic problem
> > with the SELinux mechanism. A policy that has the appropriate
> > specialized domains for reading /etc/shadow and corresponding
> > type_transition rules can prevent this mislabeling. The solution may not
> > be very satisfying because of the changes it makes to how systems are
> > typically administered, but at least it does exist within the SELinux
> > model. The same cannot be said of the problems introduced by path-based
> > mechanisms.
>
> Indeed, I tried to be quite specific to targeted policy. The point
> is that having unconfined domains makes it very challenging to reason
> about the security of the system. So, while comprehensive strict policy
> addresses that, it's also what nearly guarantees turning security off
> for most normal general purpose machines ;-)
But this is a temporary situation, until we have the infrastructure and
tools developed to make MAC truly manageable by typical end users. Not
an inherent problem.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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