Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks

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--- James Morris <[email protected]> wrote:


> With pathnames, there is an unbounded and unknown
> number of effective 
> security policies on the system, as there are an
> unbounded and unknown 
> number of ways of viewing the files via pathnames.

I agree that for traditional DAC and MAC (including
the flavors supported by SELinux) inodes is the
only way to go. SELinux is a traditional Trusted OS
architecture and addresses the traditional Trusted
OS issues. 

But as someone demonstrated earlier, not everyone
believes that an EAL makes them feel secure and that
is what LSM is really all about, allowing people
who don't care about Protection Profiles but who do
care about security to do something about it. How
many of you have lambasted me over the years because
I bled Orange? If SELinux is the only "secure" Linux
haven't the Orange Book/Common Criteria people proven
right in the end?




Casey Schaufler
[email protected]
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