eCryptfs keystore. Packet generation and parsing code. Authentication
token management code. This file has been trimmed down considerably to
support only mount-wide passphrases in the 0.1 release.
Signed off by: Phillip Hellewell <[email protected]>
Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
Signed off by: Michael Thompson <[email protected]>
Signed off by: Kent Yoder <[email protected]>
keystore.c | 860 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 files changed, 860 insertions(+)
--- linux-2.6.14-rc5-mm1/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.14-rc5-mm1-ecryptfs/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c 2005-11-01 15:51:59.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,860 @@
+/**
+ * eCryptfs: Linux filesystem encryption layer
+ * In-kernel key management code. Includes functions to parse and
+ * write authentication token-related packets with the underlying
+ * file.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 International Business Machines Corp.
+ * Author(s): Michael A. Halcrow <[email protected]>
+ * Michael C. Thompson <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
+ * License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA
+ * 02111-1307, USA.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
+#include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
+
+/**
+ * request_key returned an error instead of a valid key address;
+ * determine the type of error, make appropriate log entries, and
+ * return an error code.
+ */
+int process_request_key_err(long err_code)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ switch (err_code) {
+ case ENOKEY:
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING, "No key\n");
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ break;
+ case EKEYEXPIRED:
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING, "Key expired\n");
+ rc = -ETIME;
+ break;
+ case EKEYREVOKED:
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING, "Key revoked\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING, "Unknown error code: "
+ "[%lu]\n", err_code);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok)
+{
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Auth tok at mem loc [%p]:\n",
+ auth_tok);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * instanceof = [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->instanceof);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * instantiated = [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->instantiated);
+ switch (auth_tok->instanceof) {
+ char salt[ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE * 2 + 1];
+ char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1];
+ case ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD:
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * password = [%s]\n",
+ auth_tok->token.password.password);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * password_size = [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->token.password.password_size);
+ ecryptfs_to_hex(salt, auth_tok->token.password.salt,
+ ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE);
+ salt[ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE * 2] = '\0';
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * salt = [%s]\n", salt);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * saltless = [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->token.password.saltless);
+ memcpy(sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature,
+ ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
+ sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * signature = [%s]\n", sig);
+ break;
+ case ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY:
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * (NO PRIVATE KEY SUPPORT "
+ "IN ECRYPTFS VERSION 0.1)\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * Unrecognized instanceof\n");
+ }
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * session_key.flags = [0x%x]\n",
+ auth_tok->session_key.flags);
+ if (auth_tok->session_key.flags
+ & ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE,
+ " * Userspace decrypt request set\n");
+ }
+ if (auth_tok->session_key.flags
+ & ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_ENCRYPT) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE,
+ " * Userspace encrypt request set\n");
+ }
+ if (auth_tok->session_key.flags & ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * Contains decrypted key\n");
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE,
+ " * session_key.decrypted_key_size = [0x%x]\n",
+ auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * Decrypted session key "
+ "dump:\n");
+ if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) {
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key,
+ ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_KEY_BYTES);
+ }
+ }
+ if (auth_tok->session_key.flags & ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_ENCRYPTED_KEY) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * Contains encrypted key\n");
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE,
+ " * session_key.encrypted_key_size = [0x%x]\n",
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, " * Encrypted session key "
+ "dump:\n");
+ if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) {
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.
+ encrypted_key_size);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void wipe_auth_tok_list(struct list_head *auth_tok_list_head)
+{
+ struct list_head *walker;
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Enter\n");
+ walker = auth_tok_list_head->next;
+ while (walker != auth_tok_list_head) {
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
+ auth_tok_list_item =
+ list_entry(walker, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item,
+ list);
+ walker = auth_tok_list_item->list.next;
+ ecryptfs_kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache,
+ auth_tok_list_item);
+ }
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Exit\n");
+}
+
+kmem_cache_t *ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache;
+
+/**
+ * @return Zero on success
+ */
+static int parse_packet_length(unsigned char *data, int *offset, int *size)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ if (data[(*offset)] < 192) {
+ /* One-byte length */
+/* (*size) = data[(*offset)++] - 0x05 - ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE; */
+ (*size) = data[(*offset)++];
+ } else if (data[(*offset)] < 224) {
+ /* Two-byte length */
+ (*size) = ((data[(*offset)++] - 192) * 256);
+ (*size) += (data[(*offset)++] + 192);
+ } else if (data[(*offset)] == 255) {
+ /* Three-byte length; we're not supposed to see this */
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Three-byte packet length\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error parsing packet length\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int write_packet_length(char *dest, int *dest_offset, int size)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ if (size < 192) {
+ dest[(*dest_offset)] = size;
+ (*dest_offset)++;
+ } else if (size < 65536) {
+ dest[(*dest_offset)] = (((size - 192) / 256) + 192);
+ (*dest_offset)++;
+ dest[(*dest_offset)] = ((size - 192) % 256);
+ (*dest_offset)++;
+ } else {
+ /**
+ *p++ = 255;
+ *p++ = size >> 24;
+ *p++ = size >> 16;
+ *p++ = size >> 8;
+ *p++ = size;
+ */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING,
+ "Unsupported packet size: [%d]\n", size);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Passphrase packet.
+ *
+ * @return New offset in the packet set page; error value on error.
+ */
+static int
+parse_tag_3_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stats *crypt_stats,
+ unsigned char *data, struct list_head *auth_tok_list)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int body_size = 0;
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok;
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
+
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Enter\n");
+ if (data[i++] != 0x8c) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Enter w/ first byte != 0x8c\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_no_mem;
+ }
+ /* Released: wipe_auth_tok_list called in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set or
+ * at end of function upon failure */
+ auth_tok_list_item =
+ ecryptfs_kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache,
+ SLAB_KERNEL);
+ if (!auth_tok_list_item) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Unable to allocate memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_no_mem;
+ }
+ auth_tok = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok;
+ memset(auth_tok, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok));
+ /* TODO: Make *sure* it's encrypted; do this w/ policy tokens.
+ * Actually, this is probably not the right place to set this
+ * flag. If the eCryptfs marker matches, then we probably have
+ * a real tag 3 packet, and hence the file is most likely
+ * encrypted. */
+ rc = parse_packet_length(data, &i, &body_size);
+ if (rc) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size =
+ body_size - (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Encrypted key size = [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
+ if (data[i++] != 0x04) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Unknown version number "
+ "[%d]\n", data[i - 1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* TODO: finish the cipher mapping */
+ switch (data[i++]) {
+ case 0x01:
+ /* IDEA not supported */
+ crypt_stats->cipher[0] = '\0';
+ /* TODO: Error msg */
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
+ goto out;
+ case 0x02:
+ /* Choose Triple-DES */
+ strcpy(crypt_stats->cipher, "des3_ede");
+ break;
+ case 0x03:
+ /* Choose CAST5 */
+ strcpy(crypt_stats->cipher, "cast5");
+ break;
+ case 0x04:
+ /* Choose blowfish */
+ strcpy(crypt_stats->cipher, "blowfish");
+ break;
+ case 0x07:
+ /* Choose AES-128 */
+ strcpy(crypt_stats->cipher, "aes");
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits = 128;
+ break;
+ case 0x08:
+ /* Choose AES-192 */
+ strcpy(crypt_stats->cipher, "aes");
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits = 192;
+ break;
+ case 0x09:
+ /* Choose AES-256 */
+ strcpy(crypt_stats->cipher, "aes");
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits = 256;
+ break;
+ default:
+ crypt_stats->cipher[0] = '\0';
+ /* TODO: Error msg */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(crypt_stats);
+ if (data[i++] != 0x03) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Only S2K ID 3 is currently "
+ "supported\n");
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* TODO: finish the hash mapping */
+ switch (data[i++]) {
+ case 0x01:
+ /* Choose MD5 */
+ memcpy(auth_tok->token.password.salt, &data[i],
+ ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE);
+ i += ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE;
+ auth_tok->token.password.hash_iterations =
+ ((u32) 16 + (data[i] & 15)) << ((data[i] >> 4) + 6);
+ i++;
+ memcpy(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, &data[i],
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
+ i += auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
+ auth_tok->session_key.flags &= ~ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY;
+ auth_tok->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_ENCRYPTED_KEY;
+ auth_tok->token.password.hash_algo = 0x01;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported hash algorithm: "
+ "[%d]\n", data[i - 1]);
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* TODO: Use the keyring */
+ auth_tok->uid = current->uid;
+ auth_tok->instanceof = ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD;
+ if (data[i++] != 0xed) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "No (ecryptfs-specific) literal "
+ "packet containing authentication token "
+ "signature found after tag 3 packet\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (data[i++] != (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 13)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Unrecognizable packet\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (data[i++] != 0x62) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Unrecognizable packet\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (data[i++] != 0x08) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Unrecognizable packet\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ i += 12; /* We don't care about the filename or the timestamp */
+ /* TODO: Parametarize; we might actually want userspace to
+ * decrypt the session key. */
+ auth_tok->session_key.flags &=
+ ~ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT;
+ auth_tok->session_key.flags &=
+ ~ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_ENCRYPT;
+ ecryptfs_to_hex(auth_tok->token.password.signature, &data[i],
+ ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE);
+ auth_tok->token.password.signature[ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE] = '\0';
+ rc = i;
+ list_add(&auth_tok_list_item->list, auth_tok_list);
+ crypt_stats->encrypted = 1;
+ goto out_success;
+out:
+ ecryptfs_kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache,
+ auth_tok_list_item);
+out_no_mem:
+out_success:
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Exit; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decrypt the session key with the given auth_tok.
+ *
+ * TODO: Performance: This is a good candidate for optimization.
+ *
+ * @param auth_tok
+ * @return 0 on success; non-zero error otherwise
+ */
+static int decrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stats *crypt_stats)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ecryptfs_password *password_s_ptr;
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm = NULL;
+ struct scatterlist src_sg[2], dst_sg[2];
+ /* TODO: Use virt_to_scatterlist for these */
+ char *encrypted_session_key;
+ char *session_key;
+ password_s_ptr = &auth_tok->token.password;
+ if (password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key_set) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Session key encryption key "
+ "set; skipping key generation\n");
+ goto session_key_encryption_key_set;
+ }
+ session_key_encryption_key_set:
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Session key encryption key (size [%d])"
+ ":\n", password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key_size);
+ if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) {
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key,
+ password_s_ptr->
+ session_key_encryption_key_size);
+ }
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(crypt_stats->cipher, 0);
+ crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key,
+ password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key_size);
+ /* TODO: virt_to_scatterlist */
+ encrypted_session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encrypted_session_key) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!session_key) {
+ ecryptfs_kfree(encrypted_session_key);
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(encrypted_session_key, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
+ src_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(encrypted_session_key);
+ src_sg[0].offset = 0;
+ /* TODO: key_size < PAGE_CACHE_SIZE */
+ src_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
+ dst_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(session_key);
+ dst_sg[0].offset = 0;
+ auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size =
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
+ dst_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
+ /* TODO: Handle error condition */
+ crypto_cipher_decrypt(tfm, dst_sg, src_sg,
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
+ auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size =
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
+ memcpy(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, session_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
+ auth_tok->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY;
+ memcpy(crypt_stats->key, auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
+ crypt_stats->key_valid = 1;
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits =
+ auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size * 8;
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Decrypted session key:\n");
+ if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) {
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stats->key,
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits / 8);
+ }
+ free_page((unsigned long)encrypted_session_key);
+ free_page((unsigned long)session_key);
+out:
+ if (tfm)
+ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * N.B. This comment is applicable to 0.2 release (and later) only.
+ * Extract the authentication token signatures. eCryptfs expects this
+ * function to recover the symmetric key of the crypt_stats structure
+ * if at all possible, given the current packet set. Authentication
+ * tokens are composed of the tokens themselves and their descriptors.
+ * It is possible to have an authentication token object in the
+ * keyring that only has a descriptor and not a token component. Each
+ * eCryptfs file header contains a concatenation of descriptors. For
+ * each descriptor, this function assures that an authentication token
+ * object is instantiated in the keyring. This instantiation takes
+ * place in the request_key callout application. Thus, the callout
+ * application requires the complete descriptor. The crypt_stats
+ * object contains a set of descriptors that apply to this file. When
+ * the headers are written out, they are re-constructed from the set
+ * of authentication token descriptors.
+ *
+ * If at any point we have a problem parsing the packets, we will -EIO and
+ * just bail out.
+ *
+ * GOAL: Get crypt_stats to have the file's session key.
+ *
+ * @param dest The header page in memory
+ * @return 0 if a valid authentication token was retrieved and processed;
+ * negative value for file not encrypted or for error conditions
+ */
+int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(unsigned char *dest,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stats *crypt_stats,
+ struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry)
+{
+ int i = (ECRYPTFS_FILE_SIZE_BYTES + MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER_SIZE_BYTES);
+ int rc = 0;
+ int found_auth_tok = 0;
+ int next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet;
+ char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX];
+ struct list_head auth_tok_list;
+ struct list_head *walker;
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *chosen_auth_tok = NULL;
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stats *mount_crypt_stats =
+ &(SUPERBLOCK_TO_PRIVATE(ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stats);
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *candidate_auth_tok = NULL;
+
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Enter\n");
+ if (!contains_ecryptfs_marker(dest)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_NOTICE, "eCryptfs marker not found\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL; /* TODO: Make this a #define */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_set_default_sizes(crypt_stats);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&auth_tok_list);
+
+ /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can, these will be
+ * added the our &auth_tok_list */
+ next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet = 1;
+ while (next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet) {
+ switch (dest[i]) {
+ case 0x8c: /* tag 3 packet; s2k */
+ rc = parse_tag_3_packet(crypt_stats,
+ (unsigned char *)&dest[i],
+ &auth_tok_list);
+ if (rc != -EINVAL && rc != -ENOMEM) {
+ i += rc;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error parsing "
+ "tag 3 packet\n");
+ rc = -EIO;
+ goto out_wipe_list;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "No packet at offset "
+ "[%d] of the file header; hex value of "
+ "character is [0x%.2x]\n", i, dest[i]);
+ next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (list_empty(&auth_tok_list)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL; /* Do not support non-encrypted files */
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* If we have a global auth tok, then use it should be tried */
+ if (mount_crypt_stats->global_auth_tok) {
+ memcpy(sig, mount_crypt_stats->global_auth_tok_sig,
+ ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
+ chosen_auth_tok = mount_crypt_stats->global_auth_tok;
+ } else {
+ BUG(); /* This should not be the case in 0.1 release */
+ }
+ /* Scan list to see if our chosen_auth_tok works */
+ list_for_each(walker, &auth_tok_list) {
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
+ auth_tok_list_item =
+ list_entry(walker, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item,
+ list);
+ candidate_auth_tok = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok;
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE,
+ "Considering cadidate auth tok:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(candidate_auth_tok);
+ }
+ /* TODO: Replace ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX w/ dynamic value */
+ if ((candidate_auth_tok->instanceof == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) &&
+ !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.password.signature,
+ sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) {
+ found_auth_tok = 1;
+ goto leave_list;
+ /* TODO: Transfer the common salt into the
+ * crypt_stats salt */
+ }
+ }
+leave_list:
+ if (!found_auth_tok) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Could not find authentication "
+ "token on temporary list for sig [%.*s]\n",
+ ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, sig);
+ goto out_wipe_list;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.password),
+ &(chosen_auth_tok->token.password),
+ sizeof(struct ecryptfs_password));
+ decrypt_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stats);
+ }
+
+out_wipe_list:
+ wipe_auth_tok_list(&auth_tok_list);
+out:
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Exit; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write passphrase packet
+ *
+ * @param dest Buffer into which to write the packet
+ * @param max Maximum number of bytes that can be writtn
+ * @return Number of bytes written; 0 on error
+ */
+static int
+write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, int dest_offset, int max,
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stats *crypt_stats)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ecryptfs_key_record key_rec;
+ int i;
+ int signature_is_valid = 0;
+ int encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
+ char session_key_encryption_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
+ struct scatterlist dest_sg[2];
+ struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm = NULL;
+ int key_rec_size;
+ int offset_save = 0;
+
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Enter; dest_offset = [%d]\n",
+ dest_offset);
+ /* Check for a valid signature on the auth_tok */
+ for (i = 0; i < ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX; i++)
+ signature_is_valid |= auth_tok->token.password.signature[i];
+ if (!signature_is_valid) {
+ BUG();
+ }
+ ecryptfs_from_hex(key_rec.sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature,
+ ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE);
+ key_rec.enc_key_size_bits = crypt_stats->key_size_bits;
+ key_rec.type = ECRYPTFS_PACKET_SET_TYPE_PASSWORD;
+
+ encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
+ if (auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size == 0) {
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size =
+ ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; i++)
+ encrypted_session_key_valid |=
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i];
+ if (auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size == 0) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING, "auth_tok->session_key."
+ "encrypted_key_size == 0");
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size =
+ ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_KEY_BYTES;
+ }
+ if (encrypted_session_key_valid) {
+ memcpy(key_rec.enc_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
+ goto encrypted_session_key_set;
+ }
+ if (auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_set) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Using previously generated "
+ "session key encryption key of size [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->token.password.
+ session_key_encryption_key_size);
+ memcpy(session_key_encryption_key,
+ auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key,
+ auth_tok->token.password.
+ session_key_encryption_key_size);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE,
+ "Cached session key " "encryption key: \n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(session_key_encryption_key, 16);
+
+ goto session_key_encryption_key_set;
+ }
+ session_key_encryption_key_set:
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Session key encryption key:"
+ "\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(session_key_encryption_key, 16);
+ }
+ /* Encrypt the key with the key encryption key */
+ /* Set up the scatterlists */
+ rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stats->key,
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits / 8, src_sg, 2);
+ if (!rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist "
+ "for crypt_stats session key\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec.enc_key,
+ key_rec.enc_key_size_bits / 8, dest_sg, 2);
+ if (!rc) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist "
+ "for crypt_stats encrypted session key\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Initialize the key encryption context */
+ ASSERT(crypt_stats->cipher);
+ if ((tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(crypt_stats->cipher, 0)) == NULL) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Could not initialize crypto "
+ "context for cipher [%s]\n",
+ crypt_stats->cipher);
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Set the key encryption key */
+ rc = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, session_key_encryption_key,
+ ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_KEY_BYTES);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error setting key for crypto "
+ "context\n");
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Encrypting [%d] bytes of the key\n",
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits / 8);
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt(tfm, dest_sg, src_sg,
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits / 8);
+
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "This should be the encrypted key:\n");
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec.enc_key, key_rec.enc_key_size_bits / 8);
+encrypted_session_key_set:
+ /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the
+ * key_rec set. */
+ key_rec_size = KEY_REC_SIZE(key_rec);
+ if ((dest_offset + key_rec_size) >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n");
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ offset_save = dest_offset;
+ if ((dest_offset + 0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE
+ + (key_rec.enc_key_size_bits / 8)) >= PAGE_CACHE_SIZE) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Too many authentication tokens; "
+ "cryptfs does not yet support this many\n");
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
+ * packet tag 3 */
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x8c; /* tag 3 */
+ /* ver+cipher+s2k+hash+salt+iter+enc_key */
+ rc = write_packet_length(dest, &dest_offset,
+ (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE
+ + (key_rec.enc_key_size_bits / 8)));
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x04; /* version 4 */
+ if (strcmp(crypt_stats->cipher, "des3_ede") == 0) {
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x02; /* Triple-DES */
+ } else if (strcmp(crypt_stats->cipher, "cast5") == 0) {
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x03; /* CAST5 */
+ } else if (strcmp(crypt_stats->cipher, "blowfish") == 0) {
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x04; /* BLOWFISH */
+ } else if (strcmp(crypt_stats->cipher, "aes") == 0) {
+ switch (crypt_stats->key_size_bits) {
+ case 128:
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x07; /* AES-128 */
+ break;
+ case 192:
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x08; /* AES-192 */
+ break;
+ case 256:
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x09; /* AES-256 */
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING, "Unsupported AES key "
+ "size: [%d]\n",
+ crypt_stats->key_size_bits);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING, "Unsupported cipher: [%s]\n",
+ crypt_stats->cipher);
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x03; /* S2K */
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x01; /* MD5 (TODO) */
+ memcpy((dest + dest_offset), auth_tok->token.password.salt,
+ ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE);
+ dest_offset += ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE; /* salt */
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x60; /* hash iterations */
+ memcpy((dest + dest_offset), key_rec.enc_key,
+ key_rec.enc_key_size_bits / 8);
+ dest_offset += (key_rec.enc_key_size_bits / 8);
+ /* Write auth tok signature packet */
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0xed; /* tag 11 */
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + 13; /* packet
+ * length */
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x62; /* binary type */
+ *(dest + (dest_offset++)) = 0x08; /* filename length */
+ strncpy((dest + dest_offset), "_CONSOLE", 0x08);
+ dest_offset += 0x08;
+ memset((dest + dest_offset), 0, 4);
+ dest_offset += 4;
+ memcpy((dest + dest_offset), key_rec.sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE);
+ dest_offset += ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE;
+ *(dest + (dest_offset)) = 0x00; /* NULL terminator */
+ rc = dest_offset;
+out:
+ if (tfm)
+ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Exit; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generates a key packet set and writes it to the virtual address
+ * passed in.
+ *
+ * @param dest Page to which to write the key record set
+ * @param crypt_stats The cryptographic context from which the authentication
+ * tokens will be retrieved
+ * @return Size of the data written; 0 if there was nothing to
+ * write or if a problem was encountered
+ */
+int
+ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, int start_offset,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stats *crypt_stats,
+ struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok;
+ int dest_offset = start_offset;
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stats *mount_crypt_stats =
+ &(SUPERBLOCK_TO_PRIVATE(ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stats);
+
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Enter; start_offset = [%d]\n",
+ start_offset);
+ if (mount_crypt_stats->global_auth_tok) {
+ auth_tok = mount_crypt_stats->global_auth_tok;
+ switch (auth_tok->instanceof) {
+ case ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD:
+ rc = write_tag_3_packet(dest_base, dest_offset,
+ PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, auth_tok,
+ crypt_stats);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ecryptfs_printk(0, KERN_WARNING, "Unknown "
+ "authentication token type [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->instanceof);
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Error writing "
+ "authentication token packet with sig "
+ "= [%s]\n",
+ mount_crypt_stats->global_auth_tok_sig);
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ dest_offset += rc;
+ }
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+ out:
+ ecryptfs_printk(1, KERN_NOTICE, "Exit; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ return rc;
+}
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