> > Yes, I see your point. However the problem of malicious filesystem
> > "traps" applies to private namespaces as well (because of suid
> > programs).
> >
> > So if a user creates a private namespace, it should have the choice of:
> >
> > 1) Giving up all suid rights (i.e. all mounts are cloned and
> > propagated with nosuid)
> >
> > 2) Not giving up suid for cloned and propagated mounts, but having
> > extra limitations (suid/sgid programs cannot access unprivileged
> > "synthetic" mounts)
>
> Although I hate special cases I think that we might need 2) to avoid too
> much trouble tripping over the global namespace.
I think it should be both. How about a new clone option "CLONE_NOSUID"?
Miklos
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