> > Details:
> >
> > - new mnt_owner field in struct vfsmount
> > - if mnt_owner is NULL, it's a privileged mount
> > - global limit on unprivileged mounts in /proc/sys/fs/mount-max
>
> I think the name should be different. user-mount-max?
>
> Acutally the accounting in your patch is a little odd, we account for
> all mounts, and after mount-max is reached user mounts are denied.
> Shouldn't we account only for user mounts?
It's done similarly to files-max. I'm not particularly attached to
either view.
> > --- a6d962c4f559f3644678574a66310084fd13d130/fs/namespace.c (mode:100644 sha1:3b93e5d750ebf8452ea1264251c5b55cc89f48f8)
> > +++ uncommitted/fs/namespace.c (mode:100644)
> > @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
> > static struct list_head *mount_hashtable;
> > static int hash_mask, hash_bits;
> > static kmem_cache_t *mnt_cache;
> > -
> > +struct mounts_stat_struct mounts_stat;
> > static inline unsigned long hash(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
>
> minor nipick - please keep a empty line before the function here.
> Also I wonder whether we should have struct mounts_stat_struct at all,
> just having two variables seems a lot saner to me.
OK. Again I was just copying files_stat_struct.
> > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && (nd.mnt->mnt_owner != current->user ||
> > + (flags & MNT_FORCE)))
> > goto dput_and_out;
>
> although it won't have different results I'd reorder this to make reading
> more easy:
>
> if ((nd.mnt->mnt_owner != current->user || (flags & MNT_FORCE)) &&
> !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
OK.
> > -static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd)
> > +static struct user_struct *mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd)
> > {
> > if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > - return 0;
> > - return -EPERM;
> > -#ifdef notyet
> > - if (S_ISLNK(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
> > - return -EPERM;
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> > + if (!S_ISDIR(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
> > + !S_ISREG(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
> > if (nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) {
> > - if (current->uid != nd->dentry->d_inode->i_uid)
> > - return -EPERM;
> > + if (current->fsuid != nd->dentry->d_inode->i_uid)
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
> > }
> > if (permission(nd->dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE, nd))
> > - return -EPERM;
> > - return 0;
> > -#endif
> > + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
> > + return current->user;
>
> Currently we do allow bind mounts over every type of file for the super
> user. I think we should keep allowing that.
Yep. I didn't change that check (first two lines of function), so it
should work as it used to.
> Also I think this function wants a really big comment explaining
> all the rules for user mounts.
OK.
Thanks for the comments,
Miklos
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