On Thu, 2011-03-24 at 13:29 -0500, Bruno Wolff III wrote: > On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 07:58:48 -0700, > johhny_at_poland77 <johhny_at_poland77@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion > > > > "Users of Mozilla Firefox that are concerned about this issue should enable security.OCSP.require in the about:config dialog." > > > > How can i enable this feature in Google Chrome/Chromium? > > about:config is a URL that you can visit. You can then click on the > the setting to modify it's value. You can also type in a pattern to use > as a filter so that there are less settings shown. > > Depnding on what you are really worried about, you might be better off totally > disabling the checking the bad certificate list instead of bothering to > have the black list block access to web pages. Sending all of the certifictes > you visit to the CA to verify may be a bigger security risk than being > tricked into visiting a web page with an incorrectly issued certificate. Wierd advice IMHO. There are a number of practical reasons for not checking CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) all the time, but sending cert serial numbers to the CA is not among them. The serial number is not secret information (neither is the cert itself of course). If you don't trust the CA, then better disable certs entirely, not just CRL checking. poc -- users mailing list users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe or change subscription options: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/users Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
