Whew!! Finally someone said it for me! :) Thank you JB. On 09/01/2010 05:35 AM, JB wrote: > Hi, > > SELinux is a bad thing, concept- and design-wise. > It should be stopped now - it is a waste of resources, a blind alley. > The Linux community should stop receiving "gifts" (trojan horses) of that > nature. > > There is no point of maintaining a SELinux-like monster that is on purpose so > complicated that it excludes all kind of "intruders", be it sys admins or > users. > It met rejection by many sys admins and users, thus defeating its own purpose > to secure our systems. > > You hear: > ... we are here to help you ... we will just provide all rules for you ... > ... "relabel" the system (all you have to do is to reboot your machine)... > ... you do not have to do anything ... just accept it... Do not worry, be > happy ! ... > > This idea is so sick - any real sys admin wants to know her machine inside out, > it is the essence of her job, and to offer her a tool that she should better > not touch is preposterous. Many users want to have that knowledge too. > It is also against the free and open software ideals on which the Linux > community was built. > > The "Relabel on next reboot" is a major design flaw. > "Select if you wish to relabel then entire file system on next > reboot. Relabeling can take a very long time, depending > on the size of the system. If you are changing policy types > or going from disabled to enforcing, a relabel is required." > It is so stupid. A cry to heaven. > The future is to do away with system restarts: > - due to kernel update (this is almost done with e.g. kexec in Linux) > - due to other system or application software updates > - due to SELinux-like system "relabeling" > - any other updates > > The top brass of Linux community has by now a life-time experience of "what > works and what does not" and should be capable of initiating and rethinking > a new framework for security, for the community and not against it. > It will have a valuable support of that community. > Smart people, but sharing a common vision, should dedicate their brain and time > to it, instead of trying to maintain flawed and impractical software. > They should build a small group (in the background, far from "noice", far from > other "influences") to tackle a new concept of it. > Then selectively enlarge participation to others and Linux community. > > This is my idea of the new security concept: > - it should be real-time (operating in a background) > - it should be modular in the sense of traditional small, single function, and > stand-alone UNIX utilities > - it has to be simple to be acceptable and understandable by all sys admins and > users of UNIX/Linux systems > - it should be configurable: > - by sys admin and user (selectively) > - at any time > - dynamically > - it should show various diagnostics (alarms) in real-time, but never interfere > with or prevent a program from execution. > At least that should be a default behavior. > - it should not interfere with / try to undo any present and standard > UNIX/Linux system security measures > - it should be supplementary to existing UNIX/Linux system security > - it should be self-contained, installable and removable at any time, without > influencing the system > > I am sure others will add to and extend it, but in the spirit of improvement. > JB > > -- users mailing list users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe or change subscription options: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/users Guidelines: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
