Re: Security basics

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On 10/4/07, Alan M. Evans <fedoralist@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, 2007-10-04 at 00:26 +0100, Jonathan Underwood wrote:
> > On 03/10/2007, Alan M. Evans <fedoralist@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > Keep your SSH and your "real password" and sleep like a baby. As for me,
> > > I won't trust SSH alone. I employ other methods, including rsa keys,
> > > special iptables rules, and SELinux, to enhance the security of my
> > > system. (For the record, I run SSH on the standard port, despite the
> > > fact that I claim it would enhance security further.)
> > >
> >
> > I'd be interested to know what SElinux policy changes you've
> > implemented to add further security to sshd?
>
> None, actually. Sorry if I was misunderstood. I merely mentioned SELinux
> because I'm aware that Karl doesn't think it's useful and I do because
> of the "layered security" model that I was discussing. Karl was saying,
> in effect, that SSH and a "good" password were enough, and that's why I
> was mentioning layered security.
>
> In retrospect, it probably shouldn't have been lumped in with the rsa
> keys and iptables rules.
>
> (Also, Karl may not have anything against SELinux. I just made that
> statement without researching the list history because in my mind I
> lumped him in with the cabal of anti-SELinux guys. That impression may
> be incorrect.)
>
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Hi Alan!

With SSH and similar popular connection tools I would like to see a
utility which sets up a client on the machine seeking the connection
which talks to a server on the machine being connected to.  The
utility would use a customized "query / response" protocol on a
non-standard port to turn on the connection tool (e.g. SSH) and
establish that the connection to be made on a random non-standard port
the identity of which is communicated by a custom encrypted packet.

The original query to the server would need to be proper to illicit a
response.  So, the keys to the box, and the location of the locks are
only known to the user.

Anyone already doing this?

Tod


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