Re: MORE SSH Hacking: heads-up

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On Mon, 2004-08-16 at 17:55 +0100, James Wilkinson wrote:

> 
> > And if all else fails, the ssh client could
> > (maybe it already does) insert some artificial random delays into 
> > transmissions coming from key entries.
> 
> For that to work, the client would have to recognise when the server
> was asking for a password. That would mean deducing the intent of what
> was displayed. OpenSSH clients don't interpret the display at all: they
> just pass it on to the terminal. PuTTY, of course, has an integrated
> terminal emulator, but it still only displays what is sent: it has
> no notion of "su".

You misinterpreted. I said "coming from key entries". All the client
would need to know is if the input was coming from a terminal or not. No
reason (other than efficiency) to only protect passwords from such
sniffing.

> 
> Alternatively, of course, you could just drop these delays into all
> communication. To be effective, you'd need enough delays that it might
> be noticable over a slow connection. I've got ssh users over such
> slow connections, and I can tell you they'd not be happy about it.

If you delayed only terminal input (as opposed to, say, tunneled
application data), I think the scale of the delays necessary to confound
potential sniffers would be small enough as to be imperceivable; and on
a slow connection these delays would not be your limiting factor anyway.

> 
> A cleaner solution would be to invent an API and a terminfo code for
> programs to request passwords from a terminal, and terminals that would
> know to prompt for a password and not send anything until Return was
> pressed. If you patched su, sudo and passwd to use such a thing, and
> PuTTY and several of the Linux xterms to understand the codes, you could
> probably get enough momentum for most other vendors to jump on board.
> 
> The fact that this hasn't happened should tell you something -- notably
> that it is a highly theoretical weakness, and none of the professional
> paranoids are sufficiently worried.

Especially in the case of SSH, I have a feeling that you are correct.




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