Re: TOMOYO Linux Security Goal

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>]

Quoting Tetsuo Handa (penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp):
> Hello.
> 
> 
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Auto-learning in itself doesn't seem novel, but so you're saying it's
> > novel in ust how integrated it is - no mnual intervention necessary?
> 
> You can run your system with only policy collected by learning mode.
> Thus, you basically don't need manual intervention.
> But since there are randomly named files (i.e. temporary files),
> you pay a little time to modify policy.
> 
> The learning mode is to save time for permitting commonly accessed resources.
> Administrator reviews policy collected by learning mode. Thus the readability
> of policy is important so that administrator can understand what he/she is
> going to allow or reject.
> 
> 
> > Does grsec's learning mode come closer to yours?  (I've never used
> > grsec, just got the impression it did a lot of auto-learning stuff)
> I looked at a glance. As far as I saw, it is not real-time policy generation.
> It generates policy from logs like SELinux's audit2allow or AppArmor's
> aa-genprof . Thus, I think grsec doesn't add domains in real-time like TOMOYO.
> (I never used grsec too.)
> 
> It seems to me that grsec is designed for as fine grained access control
> as SELinux's, while AppArmor and TOMOYO is designed for usability.
> AppArmor's final implementation might come closer to grsec.
> 
> 
> > >   * namespace manipulation. (i.e. mount()/umount()/pivot_root())
> > 
> > do you track mounts namespace cloning?
> > 
> Yes. TOMOYO can recognize mount operation with the following flags.
> 
>   --bind --move --remount
>   --make-unbindable --make-private --make-slave --make-shared

No, I mean clone(CLONE_NEWNS) and unshare(CLONE_NEWNS).  Without
tracking those, it seems like a convoluted sequence of mounting,
unmonting, and mount sharing and unsharing could potentially confuse
your policy or your admins...

I haven't fully thought it through.  But at least if an admin makes a
policy update with an expectation that all processes have the same mount
trees the result could be unsafe.

> Although pathname based access control is not good at handling complicated
> mount operations like http://lwn.net/Articles/159077/ , many systems don't
> require such complicated ones.

Don't require it, but that statement is only meaningful if you then
prevent it, no?

> Speak of bind mounts, there comes vfsmount problem.
> AppArmor has been proposing patches to pass "struct vfsmount" parameter to
> VFS helper functions and LSM hooks so that AppArmor/TOMOYO can determine
> which pathname was requested in the bind-mounted environment.
> Without the vfsmount patches, we can't calculate pathname without the risk of
> AB-BA deadlock (if namespace_sem held) or crash (if namespace_sem not held).
> I think we should start discussing how the vfsmount patches can be merged.
> I'm sad to see no response for AppArmor's posting
> at http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/12/20/182 .

If the patches solve your problem, and you respond saying "TOMOYO needs
these patches too", it just might get the thread going.

> > Well I don't see how you could without a new lsm hook  :)  But it seems
> > like something you'd need to really support this claim.  Any plans of
> > it?
> I'm ready to submit patches for 2.6.24-rc6-mm1, but it seems to me that many
> developers are offline. So, I'll submit patches when they come back to online.

Sounds good.

thanks,
-serge
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/