Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]

Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:

> It would seem to me that security_secctx_to_secid() ought to suffice if the
> application code was written correctly.

That's not quite sufficient as there still needs to be a verification step to
make sure the caller is allowed to do this.

> Be aware that factors outside the LSM may be important, too. As Stephen
> points out elsewhere, Smack will require you have particular capabilities
> (CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) while a DAC LSM may require
> CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.

For what?

David
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