On Thu, Nov 29, 2007 at 03:56:28PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
> Yes, most of these schemes *can* be bypassed because some malicious code does a
> mmap() or similar trick. But what is being overlooked here is that in most
> cases, what is *desired* is a way to filter things being handled by *non*
> malicious code. Yeah, sure, a shar archive can contain a binary that does evil
> things - but if we stop /bin/cp from copying the file that has the evil in it,
> it's a non-issue.
Then all you need is scan-on-commit with commit-on-close. Which requires
no changes of anything that would run in kernel mode and no bothering with
LSM whatsoever.
Incidentally, I would really love to see the threat profile we are talking
about. I have some impressions in that area, but I would rather keep them
to myself for now - I really want to see the answers.
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