On Wed, 28 Nov 2007 16:46:13 GMT, Christoph Hellwig said: > On Wed, Nov 28, 2007 at 08:38:43AM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > Would you like to expound on that, or do you feel your claws > > are sharp enough already? > > Just take a look at code. Just to clarify - you're OK with the *concept* (a security model that determines whether you can do an I/O based on the content), it's just their code that's ugly? (Note that the concept has interesting implications in the other direction as well - rather than stopping you from reading a file that has malware, you could in theory write an anti-export package that would let you write onto external memory or outbound e-mail, but prevent the write if it was corporate-sensitive data, or whatever. Yes, I *know* a smart attacker can bypass it by simply crypting/compressing it first - but the vast majority of attackers aren't smart, and will just use 'cp' or the GUI equivalent to move the secret design documents onto the USB key... )
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