Quoting Casey Schaufler ([email protected]):
> From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>
> This patch takes advantage of the increase in capability bits
> to allocate capabilities for Mandatory Access Control. Whereas
> Smack was overloading a previously allocated capability it is
> now using a pair, one for overriding access control checks and
> the other for changes to the MAC configuration.
>
> The two capabilities allocated should be obvious in their intent.
> The comments in capability.h are intended to make it clear that
> there is no intention that implementations of MAC LSM modules
> be any more constrained by the presence of these capabilities
> than an implementation of DAC LSM modules are by the analogous
> DAC capabilities.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
>
> ---
>
> The companion patch for libcap-2.02 is provided as an attachment.
> The attachment is not a kernel patch, although it would be easy to
> mistake it for one.
>
> Thank you.
>
> include/linux/capability.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
> security/smack/smack.h | 8 --------
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 ++++++------
> 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-base/include/linux/capability.h linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-smack/include/linux/capability.h
> --- linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-base/include/linux/capability.h 2007-11-22 01:51:36.000000000 -0800
> +++ linux-2.6.24-rc3-mm1-smack/include/linux/capability.h 2007-11-24 11:26:51.000000000 -0800
> @@ -314,6 +314,23 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
>
> #define CAP_SETFCAP 31
>
> +/* Override MAC access.
> + The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
> + An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
> + to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
> + the capability it should use to do so. */
> +
> +#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE 32
> +
> +/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
> + The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
> + An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
> + to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
> + policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
> + capability it should use to do so. */
> +
> +#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
> +
I do like the descriptions.
(Will wait for Andrew's comments to be addressed before reviewing the
rest)
thanks,
-serge
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