On Sat, Nov 10, 2007 at 06:17:30PM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > --- Crispin Cowan <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > > ... > > > > Can you explain why you want a non-privileged user to be able to edit > > policy? I would like to better understand the problem here. > > > > Note that John Johansen is also interested in allowing non-privileged > > users to manipulate AppArmor policy, but his view was to only allow a > > non-privileged user to further tighten the profile on a program. To me, > > that adds complexity with not much value, but if lots of users want it, > > then I'm wrong :) > > Now this is getting interesting. It looks to me as if you've implemented > a mandatory access control scheme that some people would like to be able > to use as a discretionary access control scheme. This is creepy after > seeing the MCS implementation in SELinux, which is also a DAC scheme > wacked out of a MAC scheme. Very interesting indeed. > hehe perhaps. There are lots of issues involved with doing something like this and there are more important issues to address first. I also don't see it so much of a DAC scheme as a user defining a MAC for their own processes they don't trust. An application so confined would not have the ability to change its confinement.
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