On Wed, 12 Sep 2007, Brent Casavant wrote:
> On Wed, 12 Sep 2007, Al Viro wrote:
>
> > Give me a break. And learn about ptrace(2). This "unlinking" bullshit
> > buys you zero additional security, both for /proc/*/mem and for /dev/mem
> > (see mknod(2)).
>
> My (limited) understanding of ptrace is that a parent-child
> relationship is needed between the tracing process and the traced
> process (at least that's what I gather from the man page). This
> does give cause for concern, and I might have to see what can be
> done to alleviate this concern. I fully realize that making this
> design completely unassilable is a fools errand, but closing off
> as many attack vectors as possible seems prudent.
Hmm. The solution would appear to be as simple as making the
target program set-user-id. As long as as the attacker isn't
the superuser (or has CAP_SYS_PTRACE) we should be OK.
Thanks for the heads-up,
Brent
--
Brent Casavant All music is folk music. I ain't
[email protected] never heard a horse sing a song.
Silicon Graphics, Inc. -- Louis Armstrong
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
[Index of Archives]
[Kernel Newbies]
[Netfilter]
[Bugtraq]
[Photo]
[Stuff]
[Gimp]
[Yosemite News]
[MIPS Linux]
[ARM Linux]
[Linux Security]
[Linux RAID]
[Video 4 Linux]
[Linux for the blind]
[Linux Resources]
