[2.6 patch] remove securebits

[Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>]

It seems that since it was added in kernel 2.2.0 (sic) securebits 
was never used.

This patch therefore removes it.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>

---

 include/linux/sched.h      |    1 -
 include/linux/securebits.h |   30 ------------------------------
 kernel/capability.c        |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c       |   34 ++++++++++++++--------------------
 security/dummy.c           |   16 +++++++---------
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)

30c1d49582d183ea4a7ee0ffd886dcd9e2344115 
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 2b3c936..be2e9c4 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ struct sched_param {
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/sem.h>
 #include <linux/signal.h>
-#include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/completion.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b06178..0000000
--- a/include/linux/securebits.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
-#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
-
-#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
-
-extern unsigned securebits;
-
-/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
-   inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
-   compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
-   *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
-   0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the inheritable bitmask of the
-   executable file. */
-#define SECURE_NOROOT            0
-
-/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixes"
-   to be compatible with old programs relying on set*uid to loose
-   privileges. When unset, setuid doesn't change privileges. */
-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP   2
-
-/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specify
-   whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
-   setting is fixed or not. A setting which is fixed cannot be changed
-   from user-level. */
-
-#define issecure(X) ( (1 << (X+1)) & SECUREBITS_DEFAULT ? 	\
-		      (1 << (X)) & SECUREBITS_DEFAULT :		\
-		      (1 << (X)) & securebits )
-
-#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 20914d8..d3696a9 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
-unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
 kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ff87b80..ce8f686 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -241,14 +241,12 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 *  and permitted sets of the executable file.
 	 */
 
-	if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
-		if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
-			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
-			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
-		}
-		if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
-			bprm->cap_effective = true;
+	if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
+		cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+		cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
 	}
+	if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
+		bprm->cap_effective = true;
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -393,9 +391,7 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 	case LSM_SETID_ID:
 	case LSM_SETID_RES:
 		/* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
-		if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
-			cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
-		}
+		cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
 		break;
 	case LSM_SETID_FS:
 		{
@@ -408,16 +404,14 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 			 *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
 			 */
 
-			if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
-				if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
-					cap_t (current->cap_effective) &=
-					    ~CAP_FS_MASK;
-				}
-				if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
-					cap_t (current->cap_effective) |=
-					    (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) &
-					     CAP_FS_MASK);
-				}
+			if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
+				cap_t (current->cap_effective) &=
+				    ~CAP_FS_MASK;
+			}
+			if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
+				cap_t (current->cap_effective) |=
+				    (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) &
+				     CAP_FS_MASK);
 			}
 			break;
 		}
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 6999456..88bb1bc 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -37,15 +37,13 @@ static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective,
 			 kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
 {
 	*effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0;
-	if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
-		if (target->euid == 0) {
-			*permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
-			*effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
-		}
-		if (target->fsuid == 0) {
-			*permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
-			*effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
-		}
+	if (target->euid == 0) {
+		*permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+		*effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+	}
+	if (target->fsuid == 0) {
+		*permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+		*effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

-
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