Quoting Miklos Szeredi ([email protected]):
> > > From: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
> > >
> > > Add a new filesystem flag, that results in the VFS not checking if the
> > > current process has enough privileges to do an mknod().
> > >
> > > This is needed on filesystems, where an unprivileged user may be able
> > > to create a device node, without causing security problems.
> > >
> > > One such example is "mountlo" a loopback mount utility implemented
> > > with fuse and UML, which runs as an unprivileged userspace process.
> > > In this case the user does in fact have the right to create device
> > > nodes within the filesystem image, as long as the user has write
> > > access to the image. Since the filesystem is mounted with "nodev",
> > > adding device nodes is not a security concern.
> >
> > Could we enforce at do_new_mount() that if
> > type->fs_flags&FS_MKNOD_CHECKS_PERM then mnt_flags |= MS_NODEV?
>
> Well, the problem with that is, there will be fuse filesystems which
> will want devices to work
Crud, sorry, I forgot all fuse filesystems will have the same fs_flags.
> and for those the capability checks will be
> reenabled inside ->mknod(). In fact, for backward compatibility all
> filesystems will have the mknod checks, except ones which explicitly
> request to turn it off.
>
> Since unprivileged fuse mounts always have "nodev", the only way
Ah yes, I'd forgotten that we do if (!capable(mknod)) mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV
No objections then anyway. Thanks for indulging me :)
> security could be screwed up, is if a filesystem running with
> privileges disabled the mknod checks.
>
> I will probably add some safety guards against that into the fuse
> library, but of course there's no way to stop a privileged user from
> screwing up security anyway.
Agreed.
> If for example there's a loop mount, where the disk image file is
> writable by a user, and root mounts it without "nodev", the user can
> still create device nodes (by modifying the image) even if the mknod
> checks are enabled.
thanks,
-serge
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