RE: [PATCH] aacraid: Resend, Fix security hole

["Salyzyn, Mark" <mark_salyzyn@adaptec.com>]

ACK.

Unit tested with Adaptec RAID management applications with apparently no
issue. Will push this into matrix testing in the coming week.

Sincerely -- Mark Salyzyn

> -----Original Message-----
> From: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org 
> [mailto:linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Alan Cox
> Sent: Monday, July 23, 2007 9:51 AM
> To: torvalds@osdl.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; 
> linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: [PATCH] aacraid: Resend, Fix security hole
> 
> On the SCSI layer ioctl path there is no implicit permissions 
> check for
> ioctls (and indeed other drivers implement unprivileged 
> ioctls). aacraid
> however allows all sorts of very admin only things to be done 
> so should
> check.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
> 
> diff -u --new-file --recursive --exclude-from 
> /usr/src/exclude 
> linux.vanilla-2.6.23rc1/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c 
> linux-2.6.23rc1/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
> --- linux.vanilla-2.6.23rc1/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c	
> 2007-07-23 12:56:12.000000000 +0100
> +++ linux-2.6.23rc1/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c	
> 2007-07-23 12:57:45.000000000 +0100
> @@ -636,6 +636,8 @@
>  static int aac_cfg_ioctl(struct inode *inode,  struct file *file,
>  		unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>  {
> +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +		return -EPERM;
>  	return aac_do_ioctl(file->private_data, cmd, (void 
> __user *)arg);
>  }
>  
> @@ -689,6 +691,8 @@
>  
>  static long aac_compat_cfg_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned 
> cmd, unsigned long arg)
>  {
> +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +		return -EPERM;
>  	return aac_compat_do_ioctl((struct aac_dev 
> *)file->private_data, cmd, arg);
>  }
>  #endif
> -
-
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