Quoting Michael Halcrow ([email protected]):
> Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in
Excellent.
Very glad to see this implemented. A few comments inline.
> crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that
> should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key
> (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide
> crypt_stat struct, via the
> ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function.
>
> This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide
> crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing
> with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's
> keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user
> can make keys available at any time before or after mounting.
>
> Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we
> need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code
> for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits
> more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow.
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
> ---
> fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 208 ++++++++++--
> fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 71 ++++-
> fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 743 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 121 +++-----
> 4 files changed, 742 insertions(+), 401 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
> index 6ac6306..4f7d895 100644
> --- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
> +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
> @@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ void
> ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
> {
> memset((void *)crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat));
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&crypt_stat->keysig_list);
> + mutex_init(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
> mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
> mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
> mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_hash_tfm_mutex);
> @@ -218,20 +220,41 @@ ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
> */
> void ecryptfs_destruct_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
> {
> + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig, *key_sig_tmp;
> +
> if (crypt_stat->tfm)
> crypto_free_blkcipher(crypt_stat->tfm);
> if (crypt_stat->hash_tfm)
> crypto_free_hash(crypt_stat->hash_tfm);
> + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
Curious - at this point you know you have the last reference to
the inode, right? And you're not decrementing a use count on the
crypt_stats, you're just zeroing it out. So you must not think anyone
else has references to it.
So why do you need to grab the mutex here?
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_sig, key_sig_tmp,
> + &crypt_stat->keysig_list, crypt_stat_list) {
> + list_del(&key_sig->crypt_stat_list);
> + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, key_sig);
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
> memset(crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat));
> }
>
> void ecryptfs_destruct_mount_crypt_stat(
> struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat)
> {
> - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key)
> - key_put(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key);
> - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm)
> - crypto_free_blkcipher(mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm);
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *auth_tok, *auth_tok_tmp;
> +
> + if (!(mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED))
> + return;
> + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
Same question here - after all it's called from put_super... So if
not having the mutex cause the problem doesn't that mean the mutex
is papering over some other problem?
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok, auth_tok_tmp,
> + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list,
> + mount_crypt_stat_list) {
> + list_del(&auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list);
> + mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks--;
> + if (auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key
> + && !(auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID))
> + key_put(auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key);
> + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache, auth_tok);
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> memset(mount_crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat));
> }
>
> @@ -931,6 +954,30 @@ static void ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(
> crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_VIEW_AS_ENCRYPTED;
> }
>
> +static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(
> + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
> + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat)
> +{
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> + list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok,
> + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list,
> + mount_crypt_stat_list) {
> + rc = ecryptfs_add_keysig(crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig);
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> + mutex_unlock(
> + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals
> * @crypt_stat
> @@ -973,46 +1020,44 @@ static void ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals(
> /* Associate an authentication token(s) with the file */
> int ecryptfs_new_file_context(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry)
> {
> - int rc = 0;
> struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat =
> &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat;
> struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
> &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
> ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
> int cipher_name_len;
> + int rc = 0;
>
> ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_stat_vals(crypt_stat, mount_crypt_stat);
> - /* See if there are mount crypt options */
> - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Initializing context for new "
> - "file using mount_crypt_stat\n");
> - crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED;
> - crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
> - ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat,
> - mount_crypt_stat);
> - memcpy(crypt_stat->keysigs[crypt_stat->num_keysigs++],
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig,
> - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
> - cipher_name_len =
> - strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
> - memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher,
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
> - cipher_name_len);
> - crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0';
> - crypt_stat->key_size =
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
> - ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat);
> - } else
> - /* We should not encounter this scenario since we
> - * should detect lack of global_auth_tok at mount time
> - * TODO: Applies to 0.1 release only; remove in future
> - * release */
> - BUG();
> + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> + BUG_ON(mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks == 0);
> + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED;
> + crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
> + ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_flags_to_inode_flags(crypt_stat,
> + mount_crypt_stat);
> + rc = ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(crypt_stat,
> + mount_crypt_stat);
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to copy mount-wide key sigs "
> + "to the inode key sigs; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + cipher_name_len =
> + strlen(mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name);
> + memcpy(crypt_stat->cipher,
> + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
> + cipher_name_len);
> + crypt_stat->cipher[cipher_name_len] = '\0';
> + crypt_stat->key_size =
> + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
> + ecryptfs_generate_new_key(crypt_stat);
> rc = ecryptfs_init_crypt_ctx(crypt_stat);
> if (rc)
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error initializing cryptographic "
> "context for cipher [%s]: rc = [%d]\n",
> crypt_stat->cipher, rc);
> +out:
> return rc;
> }
>
> @@ -1776,7 +1821,7 @@ out:
> }
>
> /**
> - * ecryptfs_process_cipher - Perform cipher initialization.
> + * ecryptfs_process_key_cipher - Perform key cipher initialization.
> * @key_tfm: Crypto context for key material, set by this function
> * @cipher_name: Name of the cipher
> * @key_size: Size of the key in bytes
> @@ -1786,8 +1831,8 @@ out:
> * event, regardless of whether this function succeeds for fails.
> */
> int
> -ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name,
> - size_t *key_size)
> +ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm,
> + char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size)
> {
> char dummy_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
> char *full_alg_name;
> @@ -1829,3 +1874,98 @@ ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name,
> out:
> return rc;
> }
> +
> +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache;
> +struct list_head key_tfm_list;
> +struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex;
> +
> +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void)
> +{
> + mutex_init(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key_tfm_list);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void)
> +{
> + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm, *key_tfm_tmp;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(key_tfm, key_tfm_tmp, &key_tfm_list,
> + key_tfm_list) {
> + list_del(&key_tfm->key_tfm_list);
> + if (key_tfm->key_tfm)
> + crypto_free_blkcipher(key_tfm->key_tfm);
> + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, key_tfm);
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int
> +ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name,
> + size_t key_size)
> +{
> + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *tmp_tfm;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + tmp_tfm = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (key_tfm != NULL)
> + (*key_tfm) = tmp_tfm;
> + if (!tmp_tfm) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to allocate from "
> + "ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> + mutex_init(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_mutex);
> + strncpy(tmp_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name,
> + ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
> + tmp_tfm->key_size = key_size;
> + if ((rc = ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm,
> + tmp_tfm->cipher_name,
> + &tmp_tfm->key_size))) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize key TFM "
> + "cipher with name = [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
> + tmp_tfm->cipher_name, rc);
> + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, tmp_tfm);
> + if (key_tfm != NULL)
> + (*key_tfm) = NULL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> + list_add(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_list, &key_tfm_list);
> + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm,
> + struct mutex **tfm_mutex,
> + char *cipher_name)
> +{
> + struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + (*tfm) = NULL;
> + (*tfm_mutex) = NULL;
> + mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> + list_for_each_entry(key_tfm, &key_tfm_list, key_tfm_list) {
> + if (strcmp(key_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name) == 0) {
> + (*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm;
> + (*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex;
> + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
> + if ((rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(&key_tfm, cipher_name, 0))) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding new key_tfm to list; rc = [%d]\n",
> + rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + (*tfm) = key_tfm->key_tfm;
> + (*tfm_mutex) = &key_tfm->key_tfm_mutex;
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
> index 1b9dd9a..6ddab6c 100644
> --- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
> +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
> @@ -48,10 +48,12 @@
> #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH 0x00000004
> #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_POLICY 0x00000008
> #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR 0x00000010
> +#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY 0x00000020
> #define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK (ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PASSPHRASE \
> | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH \
> | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY \
> - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR)
> + | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR \
> + | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY)
> #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 64
> #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSPHRASE_BYTES ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH
> #define ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE 8
> @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_private_key {
> struct ecryptfs_auth_tok {
> u16 version; /* 8-bit major and 8-bit minor */
> u16 token_type;
> +#define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPT_ONLY 0x00000001
> u32 flags;
> struct ecryptfs_session_key session_key;
> u8 reserved[32];
> @@ -153,6 +156,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok {
> } token;
> } __attribute__ ((packed));
>
> +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok);
> void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok);
> extern void ecryptfs_to_hex(char *dst, char *src, size_t src_size);
> extern void ecryptfs_from_hex(char *dst, char *src, int dst_size);
> @@ -194,7 +198,6 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key)
> #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE 1024
> #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE 32
> #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_ENC_KEYS 64
> -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_KEYSIGS 2 /* TODO: Make this a linked list */
> #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES 16 /* 128 bits */
> #define ECRYPTFS_SALT_BYTES 2
> #define MAGIC_ECRYPTFS_MARKER 0x3c81b7f5
> @@ -212,6 +215,11 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key)
> #define ECRYPTFS_TAG_67_PACKET_TYPE 0x43
> #define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE 16
>
> +struct ecryptfs_key_sig {
> + struct list_head crypt_stat_list;
> + char keysig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX];
> +};
> +
> /**
> * This is the primary struct associated with each encrypted file.
> *
> @@ -231,7 +239,6 @@ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat {
> u32 flags;
> unsigned int file_version;
> size_t iv_bytes;
> - size_t num_keysigs;
> size_t header_extent_size;
> size_t num_header_extents_at_front;
> size_t extent_size; /* Data extent size; default is 4096 */
> @@ -245,7 +252,8 @@ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat {
> unsigned char cipher[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE];
> unsigned char key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
> unsigned char root_iv[ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES];
> - unsigned char keysigs[ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_KEYSIGS][ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX];
> + struct list_head keysig_list;
> + struct mutex keysig_list_mutex;
> struct mutex cs_tfm_mutex;
> struct mutex cs_hash_tfm_mutex;
> struct mutex cs_mutex;
> @@ -265,6 +273,26 @@ struct ecryptfs_dentry_info {
> struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
> };
>
> +struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok {
> +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001
> + u32 flags;
> + struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list;
> + struct key *global_auth_tok_key;
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
> + unsigned char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1];
> +};
> +
> +struct ecryptfs_key_tfm {
> + struct crypto_blkcipher *key_tfm;
> + size_t key_size;
> + struct mutex key_tfm_mutex;
> + struct list_head key_tfm_list;
> + unsigned char cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE + 1];
> +};
> +
> +extern struct list_head key_tfm_list;
> +extern struct mutex key_tfm_list_mutex;
> +
> /**
> * This struct is to enable a mount-wide passphrase/salt combo. This
> * is more or less a stopgap to provide similar functionality to other
> @@ -276,15 +304,14 @@ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat {
> #define ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED 0x00000001
> #define ECRYPTFS_XATTR_METADATA_ENABLED 0x00000002
> #define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED_VIEW_ENABLED 0x00000004
> +#define ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED 0x00000008
> u32 flags;
> - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
> - struct key *global_auth_tok_key;
> + struct list_head global_auth_tok_list;
> + struct mutex global_auth_tok_list_mutex;
> + size_t num_global_auth_toks;
> size_t global_default_cipher_key_size;
> - struct crypto_blkcipher *global_key_tfm;
> - struct mutex global_key_tfm_mutex;
> unsigned char global_default_cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE
> + 1];
> - unsigned char global_auth_tok_sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1];
> };
>
> /* superblock private data. */
> @@ -468,6 +495,9 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_header_cache_2;
> extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_xattr_cache;
> extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_lower_page_cache;
> extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_record_cache;
> +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache;
> +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache;
> +extern struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache;
>
> int ecryptfs_interpose(struct dentry *hidden_dentry,
> struct dentry *this_dentry, struct super_block *sb,
> @@ -538,9 +568,8 @@ int
> ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
> unsigned char *src, struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry);
> int ecryptfs_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t new_length);
> -int
> -ecryptfs_process_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm, char *cipher_name,
> - size_t *key_size);
> +int ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(struct crypto_blkcipher **key_tfm,
> + char *cipher_name, size_t *key_size);
> int ecryptfs_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *candidate_lower_inode);
> int ecryptfs_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *lower_inode);
> void ecryptfs_init_inode(struct inode *inode, struct inode *lower_inode);
> @@ -580,6 +609,24 @@ void
> ecryptfs_write_header_metadata(char *virt,
> struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
> size_t *written);
> +int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig);
> +int
> +ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
> + char *sig);
> +int ecryptfs_get_global_auth_tok_for_sig(
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok,
> + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig);
> +int
> +ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name,
> + size_t key_size);
> +int ecryptfs_init_crypto(void);
> +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void);
> +int ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(struct crypto_blkcipher **tfm,
> + struct mutex **tfm_mutex,
> + char *cipher_name);
> +int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key,
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok,
> + char *sig);
> int ecryptfs_write_zeros(struct file *file, pgoff_t index, int start,
> int num_zeros);
>
> diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
> index b550dea..ef4904a 100644
> --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
> +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
> @@ -402,20 +402,24 @@ out:
> *
> * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise.
> */
> -static int decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(
> - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
> - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
> +static int
> +decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
> {
> u16 cipher_code = 0;
> struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx;
> struct ecryptfs_message *msg = NULL;
> + char *auth_tok_sig;
> char *netlink_message;
> size_t netlink_message_length;
> int rc;
>
> - rc = write_tag_64_packet(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig,
> - &(auth_tok->session_key),
> + if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&auth_tok_sig, auth_tok))) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Unrecognized auth tok type: [%d]\n",
> + auth_tok->token_type);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + rc = write_tag_64_packet(auth_tok_sig, &(auth_tok->session_key),
> &netlink_message, &netlink_message_length);
> if (rc) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Failed to write tag 64 packet");
> @@ -921,126 +925,241 @@ out:
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static int
> +ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok,
> + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig)
> +{
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *walker;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + (*global_auth_tok) = NULL;
> + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> + list_for_each_entry(walker,
> + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list,
> + mount_crypt_stat_list) {
> + if (memcmp(walker->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX) == 0) {
> + (*global_auth_tok) = walker;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> +out:
> + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> /**
> - * decrypt_session_key - Decrypt the session key with the given auth_tok.
> + * ecryptfs_verify_version
> + * @version: The version number to confirm
> + *
> + * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise
> + */
> +static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version)
> +{
> + int rc = 0;
> + unsigned char major;
> + unsigned char minor;
> +
> + major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF);
> + minor = (version & 0xFF);
> + if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) {
> + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. "
> + "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n",
> + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major);
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) {
> + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. "
> + "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n",
> + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor);
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key,
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok,
> + char *sig)
> +{
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + (*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL);
> + if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n",
> + sig);
> + process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key));
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + (*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(*auth_tok_key);
> + if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR
> + "Data structure version mismatch. "
> + "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs "
> + "kernel module with major version [%d] "
> + "and minor version [%d]\n",
> + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR,
> + ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR);
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if ((*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD
> + && (*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid auth_tok structure "
> + "returned from key query\n");
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig
> + * @auth_tok: Set to the matching auth_tok; NULL if not found
> + * @crypt_stat: inode crypt_stat crypto context
> + * @sig: Sig of auth_tok to find
> + *
> + * For now, this function simply looks at the registered auth_tok's
> + * linked off the mount_crypt_stat, so all the auth_toks that can be
> + * used must be registered at mount time. This function could
> + * potentially try a lot harder to find auth_tok's (e.g., by calling
> + * out to ecryptfsd to dynamically retrieve an auth_tok object) so
> + * that static registration of auth_tok's will no longer be necessary.
> + *
> + * Returns zero on no error; non-zero on error
> + */
> +static int
> +ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig(
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok,
> + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig)
> +{
> + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
> + crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat;
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + (*auth_tok) = NULL;
> + if (ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok,
> + mount_crypt_stat, sig)) {
> + struct key *auth_tok_key;
> +
> + rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(&auth_tok_key, auth_tok,
> + sig);
> + } else
> + (*auth_tok) = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok;
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key
> + * with the given auth_tok.
> *
> * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise.
> */
> -static int decrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> - struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
> +static int
> +decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> + struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
> {
> - struct ecryptfs_password *password_s_ptr;
> - struct scatterlist src_sg[2], dst_sg[2];
> + struct scatterlist dst_sg;
> + struct scatterlist src_sg;
> struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL;
> - char *encrypted_session_key;
> - char *session_key;
> struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
> .flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
> };
> int rc = 0;
>
> - password_s_ptr = &auth_tok->token.password;
> - if (password_s_ptr->flags & ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET)
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key "
> - "set; skipping key generation\n");
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d])"
> - ":\n",
> - password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key_bytes);
> - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)
> - ecryptfs_dump_hex(password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key,
> - password_s_ptr->
> - session_key_encryption_key_bytes);
> - if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher,
> - crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name)
> - && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) {
> - desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm;
> - tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex;
> - } else {
> - char *full_alg_name;
> -
> - rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name,
> - crypt_stat->cipher,
> - "ecb");
> - if (rc)
> - goto out;
> - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0,
> - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> - kfree(full_alg_name);
> - if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
> - rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm);
> - printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating crypto context; "
> - "rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> - goto out;
> - }
> - crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
> + if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
> + ecryptfs_printk(
> + KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d]):\n",
> + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes);
> + ecryptfs_dump_hex(
> + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key,
> + auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes);
> + }
> + rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex,
> + crypt_stat->cipher);
> + if (unlikely(rc)) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get "
> + "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
> + crypt_stat->cipher, rc);
> + goto out;
> }
> - if (tfm_mutex)
> - mutex_lock(tfm_mutex);
> - rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm,
> - password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key,
> - crypt_stat->key_size);
> - if (rc < 0) {
> + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
> + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size,
> + &src_sg, 1)) != 1) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert "
> + "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key to scatterlist; "
> + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. "
> + "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = [%d]\n", rc,
> + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size =
> + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
> + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key,
> + auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size,
> + &dst_sg, 1)) != 1) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert "
> + "auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key to scatterlist; "
> + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + mutex_lock(tfm_mutex);
> + rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(
> + desc.tfm, auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key,
> + crypt_stat->key_size);
> + if (unlikely(rc < 0)) {
> + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
> printk(KERN_ERR "Error setting key for crypto context\n");
> rc = -EINVAL;
> - goto out_free_tfm;
> - }
> - /* TODO: virt_to_scatterlist */
> - encrypted_session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!encrypted_session_key) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n");
> - rc = -ENOMEM;
> - goto out_free_tfm;
> + goto out;
> }
> - session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!session_key) {
> - kfree(encrypted_session_key);
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n");
> - rc = -ENOMEM;
> - goto out_free_tfm;
> - }
> - memcpy(encrypted_session_key, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
> - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
> - src_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(encrypted_session_key);
> - src_sg[0].offset = 0;
> - BUG_ON(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
> - src_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
> - dst_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(session_key);
> - dst_sg[0].offset = 0;
> - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size =
> - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
> - dst_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
> - rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, dst_sg, src_sg,
> + rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg,
> auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
> - if (rc) {
> + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
> + if (unlikely(rc)) {
> printk(KERN_ERR "Error decrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> - goto out_free_memory;
> + goto out;
> }
> - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size =
> - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
> - memcpy(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, session_key,
> - auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
> auth_tok->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY;
> memcpy(crypt_stat->key, auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key,
> auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
> crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Decrypted session key:\n");
> - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)
> + if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
> + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "FEK of size [%d]:\n",
> + crypt_stat->key_size);
> ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key,
> crypt_stat->key_size);
> -out_free_memory:
> - memset(encrypted_session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
> - free_page((unsigned long)encrypted_session_key);
> - memset(session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
> - free_page((unsigned long)session_key);
> -out_free_tfm:
> - if (tfm_mutex)
> - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
> - else
> - crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
> + }
> out:
> return rc;
> }
>
> +int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok)
> +{
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + (*sig) = NULL;
> + switch (auth_tok->token_type) {
> + case ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD:
> + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.password.signature;
> + break;
> + case ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY:
> + (*sig) = auth_tok->token.private_key.signature;
> + break;
> + default:
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot get sig for auth_tok of type [%d]\n",
> + auth_tok->token_type);
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + }
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * ecryptfs_parse_packet_set
> * @dest: The header page in memory
> @@ -1058,25 +1177,22 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
> struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry)
> {
> size_t i = 0;
> - size_t found_auth_tok = 0;
> + size_t found_auth_tok;
> size_t next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet;
> - char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX];
> struct list_head auth_tok_list;
> - struct list_head *walker;
> - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *chosen_auth_tok = NULL;
> - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
> - &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
> - ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *matching_auth_tok = NULL;
> struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *candidate_auth_tok = NULL;
> + char *candidate_auth_tok_sig;
> size_t packet_size;
> struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;
> unsigned char sig_tmp_space[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE];
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
> size_t tag_11_contents_size;
> size_t tag_11_packet_size;
> int rc = 0;
>
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&auth_tok_list);
> - /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can, these will be
> + /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can; these will be
> * added the our &auth_tok_list */
> next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet = 1;
> while (next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet) {
> @@ -1155,73 +1271,86 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
> }
> }
> if (list_empty(&auth_tok_list)) {
> - rc = -EINVAL; /* Do not support non-encrypted files in
> - * the 0.1 release */
> + printk(KERN_ERR "The lower file appears to be a non-encrypted "
> + "eCryptfs file; this is not supported in this version "
> + "of the eCryptfs kernel module\n");
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> - /* If we have a global auth tok, then we should try to use
> - * it */
> - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) {
> - memcpy(sig, mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig,
> - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
> - chosen_auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok;
> - } else
> - BUG(); /* We should always have a global auth tok in
> - * the 0.1 release */
> - /* Scan list to see if our chosen_auth_tok works */
> - list_for_each(walker, &auth_tok_list) {
> - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
> - auth_tok_list_item =
> - list_entry(walker, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item,
> - list);
> + /* auth_tok_list contains the set of authentication tokens
> + * parsed from the metadata. We need to find a matching
> + * authentication token that has the secret component(s)
> + * necessary to decrypt the EFEK in the auth_tok parsed from
> + * the metadata. There may be several potential matches, but
> + * just one will be sufficient to decrypt to get the FEK. */
> +find_next_matching_auth_tok:
> + found_auth_tok = 0;
> + list_for_each_entry(auth_tok_list_item, &auth_tok_list, list) {
> candidate_auth_tok = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok;
> if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
> "Considering cadidate auth tok:\n");
> ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(candidate_auth_tok);
> }
> - /* TODO: Replace ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX w/ dynamic value */
> - if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD
> - && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.password.signature,
> - sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) {
> - found_auth_tok = 1;
> - goto leave_list;
> - /* TODO: Transfer the common salt into the
> - * crypt_stat salt */
> - } else if ((candidate_auth_tok->token_type
> - == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY)
> - && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key.signature,
> - sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) {
> + if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&candidate_auth_tok_sig,
> + candidate_auth_tok))) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR
> + "Unrecognized candidate auth tok type: [%d]\n",
> + candidate_auth_tok->token_type);
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto out_wipe_list;
> + }
> + if ((rc = ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig(
> + &matching_auth_tok, crypt_stat,
> + candidate_auth_tok_sig)))
> + rc = 0;
> + if (matching_auth_tok) {
> found_auth_tok = 1;
> - goto leave_list;
> + goto found_matching_auth_tok;
> }
> }
> if (!found_auth_tok) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find authentication "
> - "token on temporary list for sig [%.*s]\n",
> - ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, sig);
> + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find a usable "
> + "authentication token\n");
> rc = -EIO;
> goto out_wipe_list;
> }
> -leave_list:
> - rc = -ENOTSUPP;
> +found_matching_auth_tok:
> if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
> memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key),
> - &(chosen_auth_tok->token.private_key),
> + &(matching_auth_tok->token.private_key),
> sizeof(struct ecryptfs_private_key));
> - rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(mount_crypt_stat,
> - candidate_auth_tok,
> + rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(candidate_auth_tok,
> crypt_stat);
> } else if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) {
> memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.password),
> - &(chosen_auth_tok->token.password),
> + &(matching_auth_tok->token.password),
> sizeof(struct ecryptfs_password));
> - rc = decrypt_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat);
> + rc = decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key(
> + candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat);
> }
> if (rc) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error decrypting the "
> - "session key; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> - goto out_wipe_list;
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item_tmp;
> +
> + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error decrypting the "
> + "session key for authentication token with sig "
> + "[%.*s]; rc = [%d]. Removing auth tok "
> + "candidate from the list and searching for "
> + "the next match.\n", candidate_auth_tok_sig,
> + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, rc);
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok_list_item,
> + auth_tok_list_item_tmp,
> + &auth_tok_list, list) {
> + if (candidate_auth_tok
> + == &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok) {
> + list_del(&auth_tok_list_item->list);
> + kmem_cache_free(
> + ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache,
> + auth_tok_list_item);
> + goto find_next_matching_auth_tok;
> + }
> + }
> + BUG();
> }
> rc = ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(crypt_stat);
> if (rc) {
> @@ -1240,6 +1369,7 @@ out_wipe_list:
> out:
> return rc;
> }
> +
> static int
> pki_encrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
> @@ -1291,15 +1421,15 @@ out:
> * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error.
> */
> static int
> -write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> +write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes,
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
> - struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
> struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size)
> {
> size_t i;
> size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
> - size_t key_rec_size;
> size_t packet_size_length;
> + size_t max_packet_size;
> int rc = 0;
>
> (*packet_size) = 0;
> @@ -1329,37 +1459,23 @@ write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key, key_rec->enc_key_size);
> }
> encrypted_session_key_set:
> - /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the
> - * key_rec set. */
> - key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record)
> - - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES
> - + (key_rec->enc_key_size));
> - /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this
> - * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions
> - * later than 0.1 */
> - if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n");
> - rc = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - /* ***** TAG 1 Packet Format *****
> - * | version number | 1 byte |
> - * | key ID | 8 bytes |
> - * | public key algorithm | 1 byte |
> - * | encrypted session key | arbitrary |
> - */
> - if ((0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR,
> - "Authentication token is too large\n");
> + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
> + * packet tag 1 */
> + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 1 identifier */
> + + 3 /* Max Tag 1 packet size */
> + + 1 /* Version */
> + + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE /* Key identifier */
> + + 1 /* Cipher identifier */
> + + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */
> + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet length larger than maximum allowable; "
> + "need up to [%d] bytes, but there are only [%d] "
> + "available\n", max_packet_size, (*remaining_bytes));
> rc = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE;
> - /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
> - * packet tag 1 */
> - rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)],
> - (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE +
> - key_rec->enc_key_size),
> + rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4),
> &packet_size_length);
> if (rc) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 1 packet "
> @@ -1377,6 +1493,8 @@ encrypted_session_key_set:
> out:
> if (rc)
> (*packet_size) = 0;
> + else
> + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size);
> return rc;
> }
>
> @@ -1448,19 +1566,22 @@ write_tag_11_packet(char *dest, int max, char *contents, size_t contents_length,
> * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error.
> */
> static int
> -write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> +write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes,
> + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
> struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size)
> {
> size_t i;
> size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
> char session_key_encryption_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
> - struct scatterlist dest_sg[2];
> - struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
> + struct scatterlist dst_sg;
> + struct scatterlist src_sg;
> struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL;
> - size_t key_rec_size;
> - size_t packet_size_length;
> size_t cipher_code;
> + size_t packet_size_length;
> + size_t max_packet_size;
> + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
> + crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat;
> struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
> .tfm = NULL,
> .flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
> @@ -1470,16 +1591,25 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> (*packet_size) = 0;
> ecryptfs_from_hex(key_rec->sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature,
> ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE);
> - encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
> - for (i = 0; i < crypt_stat->key_size; i++)
> - encrypted_session_key_valid |=
> - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i];
> - if (encrypted_session_key_valid) {
> - memcpy(key_rec->enc_key,
> - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
> - auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
> - goto encrypted_session_key_set;
> + rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex,
> + crypt_stat->cipher);
> + if (unlikely(rc)) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get "
> + "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
> + crypt_stat->cipher, rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size == 0) {
> + struct blkcipher_alg *alg = crypto_blkcipher_alg(desc.tfm);
> +
> + printk(KERN_WARNING "No key size specified at mount; "
> + "defaulting to [%d]\n", alg->max_keysize);
> + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size =
> + alg->max_keysize;
> }
> + if (crypt_stat->key_size == 0)
> + crypt_stat->key_size =
> + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
> if (auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size == 0)
> auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size =
> crypt_stat->key_size;
> @@ -1487,9 +1617,24 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> && strcmp("aes", crypt_stat->cipher) == 0) {
> memset((crypt_stat->key + 24), 0, 8);
> auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = 32;
> - }
> + } else
> + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = crypt_stat->key_size;
> key_rec->enc_key_size =
> auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
> + encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; i++)
> + encrypted_session_key_valid |=
> + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i];
> + if (encrypted_session_key_valid) {
> + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "encrypted_session_key_valid != 0; "
> + "using auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, "
> + "where key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n",
> + key_rec->enc_key_size);
> + memcpy(key_rec->enc_key,
> + auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
> + key_rec->enc_key_size);
> + goto encrypted_session_key_set;
> + }
> if (auth_tok->token.password.flags &
> ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Using previously generated "
> @@ -1508,54 +1653,32 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key:\n");
> ecryptfs_dump_hex(session_key_encryption_key, 16);
> }
> - rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key,
> - key_rec->enc_key_size, src_sg, 2);
> - if (!rc) {
> + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key,
> + key_rec->enc_key_size, &src_sg, 1))
> + != 1) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist "
> - "for crypt_stat session key\n");
> + "for crypt_stat session key; expected rc = 1; "
> + "got rc = [%d]. key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n",
> + rc, key_rec->enc_key_size);
> rc = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key,
> - key_rec->enc_key_size, dest_sg, 2);
> - if (!rc) {
> + if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key,
> + key_rec->enc_key_size, &dst_sg, 1))
> + != 1) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist "
> - "for crypt_stat encrypted session key\n");
> + "for crypt_stat encrypted session key; "
> + "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. "
> + "key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", rc,
> + key_rec->enc_key_size);
> rc = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher,
> - crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name)
> - && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) {
> - desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm;
> - tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex;
> - } else {
> - char *full_alg_name;
> -
> - rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name,
> - crypt_stat->cipher,
> - "ecb");
> - if (rc)
> - goto out;
> - desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0,
> - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> - kfree(full_alg_name);
> - if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
> - rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm);
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not initialize crypto "
> - "context for cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
> - crypt_stat->cipher, rc);
> - goto out;
> - }
> - crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
> - }
> - if (tfm_mutex)
> - mutex_lock(tfm_mutex);
> + mutex_lock(tfm_mutex);
> rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, session_key_encryption_key,
> crypt_stat->key_size);
> if (rc < 0) {
> - if (tfm_mutex)
> - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
> + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error setting key for crypto "
> "context; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> goto out;
> @@ -1563,56 +1686,53 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
> rc = 0;
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting [%d] bytes of the key\n",
> crypt_stat->key_size);
> - rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, dest_sg, src_sg,
> + rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg,
> (*key_rec).enc_key_size);
> + mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
> if (rc) {
> printk(KERN_ERR "Error encrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> goto out;
> }
> - if (tfm_mutex)
> - mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This should be the encrypted key:\n");
> - if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)
> + if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) {
> + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "EFEK of size [%d]:\n",
> + key_rec->enc_key_size);
> ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key,
> key_rec->enc_key_size);
> -encrypted_session_key_set:
> - /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the
> - * key_rec set. */
> - key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record)
> - - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES
> - + (key_rec->enc_key_size));
> - /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this
> - * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions
> - * later than 0.1 */
> - if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n");
> - rc = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> }
> - /* TODO: Packet size limit */
> - /* We have 5 bytes of surrounding packet data */
> - if ((0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE
> - + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Authentication token is too "
> - "large\n");
> +encrypted_session_key_set:
> + /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
> + * packet tag 3 */
> + max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 3 identifier */
> + + 3 /* Max Tag 3 packet size */
> + + 1 /* Version */
> + + 1 /* Cipher code */
> + + 1 /* S2K specifier */
> + + 1 /* Hash identifier */
> + + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE /* Salt */
> + + 1 /* Hash iterations */
> + + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */
> + if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Packet too large; need up to [%d] bytes, but "
> + "there are only [%d] available\n", max_packet_size,
> + (*remaining_bytes));
> rc = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> - /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
> - * packet tag 3 */
> dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_3_PACKET_TYPE;
> - /* ver+cipher+s2k+hash+salt+iter+enc_key */
> - rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)],
> - (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE
> - + key_rec->enc_key_size),
> + /* Chop off the Tag 3 identifier(1) and Tag 3 packet size(3)
> + * to get the number of octets in the actual Tag 3 packet */
> + rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4),
> &packet_size_length);
> if (rc) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 3 packet "
> - "header; cannot generate packet length\n");
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error generating tag 3 packet header; cannot "
> + "generate packet length. rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> goto out;
> }
> (*packet_size) += packet_size_length;
> dest[(*packet_size)++] = 0x04; /* version 4 */
> + /* TODO: Break from RFC2440 so that arbitrary ciphers can be
> + * specified with strings */
> cipher_code = ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string(crypt_stat);
> if (cipher_code == 0) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unable to generate code for "
> @@ -1631,10 +1751,10 @@ encrypted_session_key_set:
> key_rec->enc_key_size);
> (*packet_size) += key_rec->enc_key_size;
> out:
> - if (desc.tfm && !tfm_mutex)
> - crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
> if (rc)
> (*packet_size) = 0;
> + else
> + (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size);
> return rc;
> }
>
> @@ -1662,24 +1782,43 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base,
> size_t max)
> {
> struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok;
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
> struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
> &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
> ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
> size_t written;
> struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec;
> + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig;
> int rc = 0;
>
> (*len) = 0;
> + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
> key_rec = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!key_rec) {
> rc = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) {
> - auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok;
> + list_for_each_entry(key_sig, &crypt_stat->keysig_list,
> + crypt_stat_list) {
> + memset(key_rec, 0, sizeof(*key_rec));
> + rc = ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok,
> + mount_crypt_stat,
> + key_sig->keysig);
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to get the global "
> + "auth_tok; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> + goto out_free;
> + }
> + if (global_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID) {
> + printk(KERN_WARNING
> + "Skipping invalid auth tok with sig = [%s]\n",
> + global_auth_tok->sig);
> + continue;
> + }
> + auth_tok = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok;
> if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) {
> rc = write_tag_3_packet((dest_base + (*len)),
> - max, auth_tok,
> + &max, auth_tok,
> crypt_stat, key_rec,
> &written);
> if (rc) {
> @@ -1689,10 +1828,9 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base,
> }
> (*len) += written;
> /* Write auth tok signature packet */
> - rc = write_tag_11_packet(
> - (dest_base + (*len)),
> - (max - (*len)),
> - key_rec->sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written);
> + rc = write_tag_11_packet((dest_base + (*len)), &max,
> + key_rec->sig,
> + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written);
> if (rc) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing "
> "auth tok signature packet\n");
> @@ -1701,9 +1839,8 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base,
> (*len) += written;
> } else if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
> rc = write_tag_1_packet(dest_base + (*len),
> - max, auth_tok,
> - crypt_stat,mount_crypt_stat,
> - key_rec, &written);
> + &max, auth_tok,
> + crypt_stat, key_rec, &written);
> if (rc) {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error "
> "writing tag 1 packet\n");
> @@ -1716,19 +1853,69 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base,
> rc = -EINVAL;
> goto out_free;
> }
> - } else
> - BUG();
> - if (likely((max - (*len)) > 0)) {
> + }
> + if (likely(max > 0)) {
> dest_base[(*len)] = 0x00;
> } else {
> ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing boundary byte\n");
> rc = -EIO;
> }
> -
> out_free:
> kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, key_rec);
> out:
> if (rc)
> (*len) = 0;
> + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache;
> +
> +int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig)
> +{
> + struct ecryptfs_key_sig *new_key_sig;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + new_key_sig = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!new_key_sig) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + printk(KERN_ERR
> + "Error allocating from ecryptfs_key_sig_cache\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> + memcpy(new_key_sig->keysig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
> + mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
> + list_add(&new_key_sig->crypt_stat_list, &crypt_stat->keysig_list);
> + mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
> +out:
> return rc;
> }
> +
> +struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache;
> +
> +int
> +ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
> + char *sig)
> +{
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!new_auth_tok) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating from "
> + "ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache\n");
> + goto out;
> + }
> + memcpy(new_auth_tok->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
> + new_auth_tok->sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
> + mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> + list_add(&new_auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list,
> + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list);
> + mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks++;
> + mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
> index 606128f..5da6180 100644
> --- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
> +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
> @@ -179,38 +179,40 @@ static match_table_t tokens = {
> {ecryptfs_opt_err, NULL}
> };
>
> -/**
> - * ecryptfs_verify_version
> - * @version: The version number to confirm
> - *
> - * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise
> - */
> -static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version)
> +static int ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(
> + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat)
> {
> + struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
> int rc = 0;
> - unsigned char major;
> - unsigned char minor;
> -
> - major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF);
> - minor = (version & 0xFF);
> - if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. "
> - "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n",
> - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major);
> - rc = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. "
> - "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n",
> - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor);
> - rc = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok,
> + &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list,
> + mount_crypt_stat_list) {
> + if ((rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(
> + &global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key,
> + &global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok,
> + global_auth_tok->sig))) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find valid key in user "
> + "session keyring for sig specified in mount "
> + "option: [%s]\n", global_auth_tok->sig);
> + global_auth_tok->flags |= ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID;
> + rc = 0;
> + } else
> + global_auth_tok->flags &= ~ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID;
> }
> -out:
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat(
> + struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat)
> +{
> + memset((void *)mount_crypt_stat, 0,
> + sizeof(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat));
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list);
> + mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
> + mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_MOUNT_CRYPT_STAT_INITIALIZED;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * ecryptfs_parse_options
> * @sb: The ecryptfs super block
> @@ -264,14 +266,13 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
> case ecryptfs_opt_sig:
> case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig:
> sig_src = args[0].from;
> - sig_dst =
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig;
> - memcpy(sig_dst, sig_src, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
> - sig_dst[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
> - "The mount_crypt_stat "
> - "global_auth_tok_sig set to: "
> - "[%s]\n", sig_dst);
> + rc = ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(mount_crypt_stat,
> + sig_src);
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register "
> + "global sig; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> sig_set = 1;
> break;
> case ecryptfs_opt_debug:
> @@ -358,55 +359,21 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
> if (!cipher_key_bytes_set) {
> mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size = 0;
> }
> - rc = ecryptfs_process_cipher(
> - &mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm,
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
> - &mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size);
> - if (rc) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize cipher [%s] "
> - "with key size [%Zd] bytes; rc = [%d]\n",
> + if ((rc = ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(
> + NULL, mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
> + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size))) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize cipher with "
> + "name = [%s] and key size = [%d]; rc = [%d]\n",
> mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name,
> mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size, rc);
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm = NULL;
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key = NULL;
> - rc = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - mutex_init(&mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex);
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Requesting the key with description: "
> - "[%s]\n", mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig);
> - /* The reference to this key is held until umount is done The
> - * call to key_put is done in ecryptfs_put_super() */
> - auth_tok_key = request_key(&key_type_user,
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig,
> - NULL);
> - if (!auth_tok_key || IS_ERR(auth_tok_key)) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find key with "
> - "description: [%s]\n",
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig);
> - process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(auth_tok_key));
> rc = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> - auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(auth_tok_key);
> - if (ecryptfs_verify_version(auth_tok->version)) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Data structure version mismatch. "
> - "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs kernel "
> - "module with major version [%d] and minor "
> - "version [%d]\n", ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR,
> - ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR);
> - rc = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - if (auth_tok->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD
> - && auth_tok->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
> - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Invalid auth_tok structure "
> - "returned from key query\n");
> - rc = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> + if ((rc = ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(mount_crypt_stat))) {
> + printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not "
> + "properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
> }
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_key = auth_tok_key;
> - mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok = auth_tok;
> + rc = 0;
> out:
> return rc;
> }
> --
> 1.5.1.6
>
> -
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