Hi!
> >What you do with AppArmor, instead of addressing the problem, is just
> >redefine the environment along the lines of "set your house into a rock
> >wall so there is only one path to it".
>
> Harrumph. Those analogies sound good but aren't a very good guide.
>
> Let's take a concrete example. Consider the following fragment of a
> policy for Mozilla:
> allow ~/.mozilla
> deny ~
> Ignore the syntax; the goal is to allow Mozilla to access files under
> ~/.mozilla but nothing else under my home directory. This is a perfectly
> reasonable policy fragment to want to enforce. And enforcing it in
> the obvious way using pathname-based access control is not a ridiculous
> thing to do.
Unfortunately, mozilla needs temporary files IIRC. And when you add
allow /tmp
to your config files, you get system where your fellow users can
ln HOME/.ssh/identity /tmp/to-steal (or
ln HOME/.profile /tmp/put-evil-code-here)
and AA protection is not effective any more.
Would _you_ do this mistake?
Would our users do this mistake?
Is it right to provide them with auto-learning tools to make this
mistake really easy?
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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