Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

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Hi!

One more...

> 2. This is argument #1 in a different guise and I find it about as weak.
> Pathname-based access control has strengths and weaknesses.  I think
> users and Linux distributions are in a better position to evaluate those
> tradeoffs than L-K.  Competition is good.

It took you quite a lot of time to realize AA does not do IPC (and all
the implications of that). I do not think Linux _users_ can do
informed decision here. Novell marketing did too good job here.

Heck, even I am not sure if I understand the implications of not doing
IPC confinement. Is shared memory commonly used in a way that allows
exploiting? I know it is a problem, and you probably could kill init
from hacked apache..... but what would you do to break out of jail?

							Pavel
(please cc me)
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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