Quoting James Morris ([email protected]):
> On Wed, 27 Jun 2007, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>
> > Quoting Kyle Moffett ([email protected]):
> > > This whole discussion boils down to 2 points:
> >
> > Yes it can, but not the two you list.
> >
> > > 1) As currently implemented, no LSM may be safely rmmod-ed
> >
> > That's not the rationale for the patch, it's just some talking point you
> > picked up. The rationale for the patch is to prevent abuse.
>
> This is not correct. Reducing API abuse is simply a bonus.
>
> The rationale for the patch is to remove unneeded infrastructure which
> complicates security by introducing the idea that the security module can
> be removed at all.
>
> It was in response to your very own posting about the new capabilities
> code which would need to take this into account.
It's (IMO) by far not the optimal "solution" :) If it is felt a
solution is really needed, re-introduction of a
security_ops->module_exit hook and introduction of CAP_SYS_CAPDISABLE
would be better.
But I'm well aware there are far too many (separate and not so separate)
agendas driving this, and have no expectations of being able to stop it.
James, FWIW, I'm sorry I haven't had a chance to actually test the
patch. I'll try to get around to that today or at least this week.
-serge
> Recall:
>
> On Sun, 24 Jun 2007, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>
> > > 2) Allocate capability bit-31 for CAP_SETFCAP, and use it to gate
> > > whether the user can set this xattr on a file or not. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is
> > > way too overloaded and this functionality is special.
> >
> > The functionality is special, but someone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can always
> > unload the capability module and create the security.capability xattr
> > using the dummy module.
> >
> > If we do add this cap, do we want to make it apply to all security.*
> > xattrs?
>
> The underlying issue here is the notion of security mechanisms which are
> built as loadable modules. It's not useful for any in-tree users, and
> introduces several unnecessary problems which then need to be addressed.
>
> A better approach would be to make LSM a statically linked interface.
>
> This would also allow us to unexport the LSM symbols and reduce the API
> abuse by third-party modules.
>
>
>
> - James
> --
> James Morris
> <[email protected]>
> -
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