Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

[Crispin Cowan <crispin@novell.com>]

david@lang.hm wrote:
> On Fri, 8 Jun 2007, Greg KH wrote:
>> I still want to see a definition of the AA "model" that we can then use
>> to try to implement using whatever solution works best.  As that seems
>> to be missing the current argument of if AA can or can not be
>> implemented using SELinux or something totally different should be
>> stopped.
> the way I would describe the difference betwen AA and SELinux is:
>
> SELinux is like a default allow IPS system, you have to describe
> EVERYTHING to the system so that it knows what to allow and what to stop.
>
> AA is like a default deny firewall, you describe what you want to
> happen, and it blocks everything else without you even having to
> realize that it's there.
That's not quite right:

    * SELinux Strict Policy is a default-deny system: it specifies
      everything that is permitted system wide, and all else is denied.
    * AA and the SELinux Targeted Policy are hybrid systems:
          o default-deny within a policy or profile: confined processes
            are only permitted to do what the policy says, and all else
            is denied.
          o default-allow system wide: unconfined processes are allowed
            to do anything that classic DAC permissions allow.

Crispin

-- 
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.               http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/
Director of Software Engineering   http://novell.com
	AppArmor Chat: irc.oftc.net/#apparmor

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