On Sun, 3 Jun 2007, Ulrich Drepper wrote:
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>
> Davide Libenzi wrote:
> >> If randomizing each allocator is too expensive then randomize at the
> >> very least the number of the first descriptor you give out.
> >
> > Can you tell me how this can be a problem, and in which way making a
> > random thing would help?
>
> In attacking an application every bit of known data can be used in an
> exploit. Be it something as simple as having a predetermined value at a
> certain point in the program since it loaded a file descriptor into a
> register.
>
> But what I'm mostly thinking about is the case where I/O could be
> redirected. The intruding program could call dup2() and suddenly the
> program wanting to write a password to disk could be directed to send it
> over a socket. One could imagine countless such attacks.
>
> I don't say such an attack exists today. But this is no reason to not
> implement these extra security measures. The cost of a randomized star
> base (offset from 2^30) should be zero.
Randomizing the base is not a problem. Should this be always, or flag
driven?
- Davide
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