On Fri, 1 Jun 2007, [email protected] wrote:
On Thu, 24 May 2007 14:47:27 -0000, Pavel Machek said:
Yes, if there's significantly more remote bad guys than local bad
guys, and if remote bad guys can't just get some local user first, AA
still has some value.
Experience over on the Windows side of the fence indicates that "remote bad
guys get some local user first" is a *MAJOR* part of the current real-world
threat model - the vast majority of successful attacks on end-user boxes these
days start off with either "Get user to (click on link|open attachment)" or
"Subvert the path to a website (either by hacking the real site or hijacking
the DNS) and deliver a drive-by fruiting when the user visits the page".
and if your local non-root user can create a hard link to /etc/shadow and
access it they own your box anyway (they can just set the root password to
anything they want). since I don't hear about this happening there are
other restrictions that prevent this anyway.
everyone recognises that AA has limits, but the way people are
emphisising these acknowledged limits is beginning to sound a bit shrill.
David Lang
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