Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <[email protected]> writes:
> [snip]
> Well, my point was exactly that App Armor doesn't (as far as I know) do
> anything to enforce the argv[0] convention, nor would it in general
> prevent a confined program from making a symlink or hard link. Even
> disregarding that, it seems very fragile in general to make an suid
> program (there would be no point in confining the execution of a
> non-suid program) perform essentially access control based on argv[0].
Note that by "confining the execution of a non-suid program", I mean
defining an App Armor profile that prevents the execution of a
particular non-suid program, unless of course the program file itself
contains secret information, which is irrelevant to this discussion.
--
Jeremy Maitin-Shepard
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