On Thursday 24 May 2007 03:28, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 23 May 2007, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
> > This is backwards from what AppArmor does. The policy defines which paths
> > may be accessed; all paths not explicitly listed are denied. If files are
> > mounted at multiple locations, then the policy may allow access to some
> > locations but not to others. That's not a hole.
>
> I don't know what else you'd call it.
AppArmor doesn't label files; it's a different model from SELinux. Its policy
defines which processes may access which paths. Even if for some reson the
same files were visible elsewhere, the policy wouldn't cover those other
paths, and so accessing them would be denied. So again, that's not a security
hole.
> Would you mind providing some concrete examples of how such a model would
> be useful?
The model is explained, with examples, in the technical documentation at
http://forgeftp.novell.com//apparmor/LKML_Submission-May_07/.
Thanks,
Andreas
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