Re: [AppArmor 39/41] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

[Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>]

Hi!

> > > +
> > > +	/* get optional subprofiles */
> > > +	if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_LIST, "hats")) {
> > > +		while (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_LISTEND, NULL)) {
> > > +			struct aa_profile *subprofile;
> > > +			subprofile = aa_unpack_profile(e);
> > 
> > Is there any check that would guard the recursion from stack
> > overflow on malicious input?  
> 
> It's nice to check for consistency though, so we're adding that. Profile 
> loading is a trusted operation, at least so far, and so security wise we 
> don't actually have to care --- if loading an invalid profile can bring down 
> the system, then that's no worse than an arbitrary module that crashes the 
> machine. Not sure if there will ever be user loadable profiles; at least at 
> that point we had to care.

It is not a _security_ problem, but face it, mount("/very weird
filename") is not expected to crash the kernel, either. It is
quality-of-impelmentation problem.

-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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