* Andi Kleen <[email protected]> wrote:
> > sys_exec and other security boundaries must be synchronous
> > only and not allow async "spill over" (consider setuid async binary
> > patching)
>
> He probably would need some generalization of Andrea's seccomp work.
> Perhaps using bitmaps? For paranoia I would suggest to white list, not
> black list calls.
what i've implemented in my tree is sys_async_call_table[] which is a
copy of sys_call_table[] with certain entries modified (by architecture
level code, not by kernel/async.c) to sys_ni_syscall(). It's up to the
architecture to decide which syscalls are allowed.
but i could use a bitmap too - whatever linear construct. [ I'm not sure
there's much connection to seccomp - seccomp uses a NULL terminated
whitelist - while syslets would use most of the entries (and would not
want to have the overhead of checking a blacklist). ]
Ingo
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