Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Tue, 2006-11-14 at 16:19 -0500, James Morris wrote:
On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, David Howells wrote:
+static u32 selinux_set_fscreate_secid(u32 secid)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ u32 oldsid = tsec->create_sid;
+
+ tsec->create_sid = secid;
+ return oldsid;
+}
The ability to set this needs to be mediated via MAC policy.
See selinux_setprocattr()
That's different - selinux_set_fscreate_secid() is for internal use by a
kernel module that wishes to temporarily assume a particular fscreate
SID, whereas selinux_setprocattr() handles userspace writes
to /proc/self/attr nodes. Imposing a permission check here makes no
sense.
Since that discussion last week I have been thinking about this and I
have to say I agree with Steve. This should be a kernel only mechanism
for impersonating another SID - controlling the setting of process
attributes shouldn't be restricted as this will only lead to
inconsistencies in those attributes.
Karl
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