Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps

[Chris Friedhoff <chris@friedhoff.org>]

Page http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html updated ...
Kernel 2.6.18.2 updated ...
System keeps on humming ...
Is anyone else using/testing the patch? Please give feedback ...
Thanks ...

Chris


On Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:10:21 -0600
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:

> Sorry, I should have noticed and fixed this much sooner.  This
> patch is against the latest full fscaps patch which I'm replying
> to.
> 
> From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:01:49 -0600
> Subject: security: file caps: fix unused variable warnings
> 
> Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
> when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
> up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
> function.
> 
> Rename vfs_cap_data_struct to remove redundant '_struct'.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> ---
>  security/commoncap.c |   73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
>  1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 6f5e46c..4b50b4d 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -109,16 +109,17 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct 
>  	target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
>  #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
>  #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
> -struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
> +struct vfs_cap_data {
>  	__u32 version;
>  	__u32 effective;
>  	__u32 permitted;
>  	__u32 inheritable;
>  };
>  
> -static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
> +static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
>  {
>  	cap->version = le32_to_cpu(cap->version);
>  	cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(cap->effective);
> @@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static inline void convert_to_le(struct 
>  	cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(cap->inheritable);
>  }
>  
> -static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
> +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
>  {
>  	int i;
>  
> @@ -149,39 +150,14 @@ static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_c
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
> +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  {
>  	struct dentry *dentry;
>  	ssize_t rc;
> -	struct vfs_cap_data_struct cap_struct;
> +	struct vfs_cap_data cap_struct;
>  	struct inode *inode;
>  
> -	/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
> -
> -	cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
> -	cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
> -	cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
> -
> -	/*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
> -	 *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
> -	 *  capability sets for the file.
> -	 *
> -	 *  If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
> -	 *  and permitted sets of the executable file.
> -	 */
> -
> -	if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
> -		if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
> -			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
> -			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
> -		}
> -		if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
> -			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
> -	}
> -
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
> -	/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
> -
>  	dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
>  	inode = dentry->d_inode;
>  	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) {
> @@ -216,9 +192,42 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
>  	bprm->cap_permitted = cap_struct.permitted;
>  	bprm->cap_inheritable = cap_struct.inheritable;
>  
> -#endif
>  	return 0;
>  }
> +#else
> +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> +	/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
> +
> +	cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
> +	cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
> +	cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
> +
> +	/*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
> +	 *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
> +	 *  capability sets for the file.
> +	 *
> +	 *  If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
> +	 *  and permitted sets of the executable file.
> +	 */
> +
> +	if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
> +		if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
> +			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
> +			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
> +		}
> +		if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
> +			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
> +	}
> +
> +	return set_file_caps(bprm);
> +}
>  
>  void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
>  {
> -- 
> 1.4.1
> 


--------------------
Chris Friedhoff
chris@friedhoff.org
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