Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps

[Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>]

On Fri, 2006-11-03 at 14:00 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting chris friedhoff (chris@friedhoff.org):
> > The patch applies cleanly , compiles and runs smoothly against 2.6.18.1.
> > 
> > I'm running slackware-current with a 2.6.18.1 kernel on an ext3
> > filesystem.
> > 
> > Background why I use the patch:
> > With 2.6.18 to create a tuntap interface CAP_NET_ADMIN is required.
> > Qemu uses tuntap to create a tap interface as a virtual net interface.
> > Instead now running qemu with root privileges to give it the right
> > to create a tap interface, i granted qemu with the help of the patch and
> > Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools the cap-net_admin capability. So qemu
> > runs again without root privilege but has now the right to create the
> > tap interface.
> > 
> > Thanks for the patch. It reduces my the need of suid-bit progs.
> > It should be given a spin in -mm.
> 
> One question is, if this were to be tested in -mm, do we want to keep
> this mutually exclusive from selinux through config, or should selinux
> stack on top of this?

Given that SELinux already stacks with capability and you aren't using
the security fields (last I looked), it would seem trivial to enable
stacking with fscaps (just add a few secondary_ops calls to the SELinux
hooks, right?).

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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