On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 04:02:24PM +0200, Bastian Blank wrote: > The commit 778c1144771f0064b6f51bee865cceb0d996f2f9 replaced the old > root-based security checks in procfs with processed based ones. The new behaviour even allows a user to escape from the chroot by using chdir to /proc/$pid/cwd or /proc/$pid/root of a process he owns and lives outside of the chroot. Bastian -- Punishment becomes ineffective after a certain point. Men become insensitive. -- Eneg, "Patterns of Force", stardate 2534.7
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
- Follow-Ups:
- Re: 2.6.18 - check for chroot, broken root and cwd values in procfs
- From: [email protected] (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: 2.6.18 - check for chroot, broken root and cwd values in procfs
- References:
- 2.6.18 - check for chroot, broken root and cwd values in procfs
- From: Bastian Blank <[email protected]>
- 2.6.18 - check for chroot, broken root and cwd values in procfs
- Prev by Date: Re: [linux-pm] Bug in PCI core
- Next by Date: Re: [PATCH 01/02 V3] net/ipv6: seperate sit driver to extra module
- Previous by thread: Re: 2.6.18 - check for chroot, broken root and cwd values in procfs
- Next by thread: Re: 2.6.18 - check for chroot, broken root and cwd values in procfs
- Index(es):